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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States has long prided itself on the quality of justice 
dispensed by its criminal courts.  We have taken special care to ensure that 
convictions rest on a reliable basis.  In contrast to civil law systems that 
recognize few exclusionary rules of evidence, the United States still adheres 
to the common law trilogy of exclusionary rules based on the supposed 
unreliability of certain types of evidence.2  Since the common law preferred 
that witnesses recite facts and allow the trier of fact to decide which, if any, 
inferences to draw from the facts, American courts enforce a general opinion 
prohibition.3  Similarly, since the common law was skeptical of paraphrasing 
documents, the courts generally demand the production of the original 
document and exclude secondary evidence of a document’s contents.4  
Finally, the common law preferred that witnesses appear in person, testify 
under oath, and be subject to cross-examination in view of the trier of fact.  
That preference accounts for the general exclusion of hearsay testimony.5  
Dean John Henry Wigmore famously remarked that the hearsay doctrine was 
the “most characteristic rule of the Anglo-American law of Evidence.”6  
Although England has substantially liberalized its version of the hearsay 
rule, American courts still vigorously enforce the rule.7  The United States 
arguably has the most restrictive set of evidentiary rules in the world; and if 
those rules serve their intended purpose of enhancing the reliability of the 
verdicts resting on evidence, the typical American conviction should be 
exceptionally reliable. 
In its celebrated 1993 decision, Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,8 the Supreme Court dealt with one aspect of the 
opinion prohibition, namely, the restrictions on the admissibility of expert 
opinions.  Predictably, the Court focused on the question of the reliability of 
expert opinions admitted under the Federal Rules of Evidence.  In Justice 
Blackmun’s words, “under the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and 
all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but 
 
 2  RONALD L. CARLSON, EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, JULIE SEAMAN & ERICA BEECHER-
MONAS, EVIDENCE: TEACHING MATERIALS FOR AN AGE OF SCIENCE AND STATUTES 96 (7th ed. 
2012).   
 3  FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee’s note on proposed rule (“The older cases often 
contained strictures against allowing witnesses to express opinions upon ultimate issues, as a 
particular aspect of the rule against opinions.”). 
 4  FED. R. EVID. 1002. 
 5  FED. R. EVID. 801, 802. 
 6  JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN 
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, INCLUDING THE STATUTES AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS OF ALL 
JURISDICTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA § 1364 (3d ed. 1940). 
 7  CARLSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 566–57.   
 8  509 U.S. 579 (1993).   
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reliable.”9  He stated that to be admissible, a scientific opinion “must be 
derived by the scientific method . . . [,] supported by appropriate 
validation.”10  Justice Blackmun explained that that test “establishes a 
standard of evidentiary reliability.”11  Thus, in his view, “evidentiary 
reliability [is] based upon scientific validity.”12 
A. The Indications That Flawed Expert Testimony Has Already 
Contributed to a Significant Number of Wrongful Convictions 
Given this strong judicial commitment to reliability, the revelations of 
the number of wrongful convictions in the United States are troubling.  By 
late 2016, post-conviction DNA testing had resulted in the exoneration of 
over 340 wrongfully convicted accused.13  More broadly, the National 
Registry of Exonerations listed nearly 2,000 wrongful convictions.14  In one 
way or another, all fifty states now permit post-conviction DNA testing to 
identify wrongful convictions.15  The magnitude of the problem has 
prompted twenty-eight states to go to the length of enacting legislative 
schemes for compensating wrongfully convicted accused.16 
To make matters worse, it is clear that flawed expert testimony 
contributed to a significant percentage of these wrongful convictions.  
Invalid expert testimony has become a disturbingly “recurrent theme[]” in 
 
 9  Id. at 589.  See also id. at 597 (“[T]he Rules of Evidence—especially Rule 702—do 
assign to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable 
foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.”).   
 10  Id. at 590. 
 11  Id.   
 12  Id. at 590–91 n.9.  See also Vincent P. Iannece, Note, Breaking Bad Science:  Due 
Process as a Vehicle for Post-Conviction Relief When Convictions Are Based on Unreliable 
Scientific Evidence, 89 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 195, 196 (2015) (noting “the Supreme Court’s 
requirement that only reliable expert testimony be admitted”). 
 13  PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: 
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE-
COMPARISON METHODS 3 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/m
icrosites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic_science_report_final.pdf [hereinafter PCAST].  See 
also M. Chris Fabricant & Tucker Carrington, The Shifted Paradigm: Forensic Science’s 
Overdue Evolution from Magic to Law, 4 VA. J. CRIM. L. 1, 13, 19 (2016).  See also id. at 63–
93. 
 14  As of February 26, 2017, the registry had catalogued 1,994 exonerations.  NAT’L 
REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration (last visited 
Apr. 18, 2018).  See also Ken Strutin, Report—President’s Council of Advisors on Science 
and Technology Casts Doubt on Criminal Forensics, LLRX (Mar. 19, 2017), 
http://www.llrx.com/2017/03/report-presidents-council-of-advisors-on-science-and-technolo
gy; Meghan J. Ryan & John Adams, Cultivating Judgment on the Tools of Wrongful 
Conviction, 68 SMU L. REV. 1073, 1076 (2015) (“Since 1989, over 1,700 individuals have 
been exonerated of the crimes for which they were convicted”). 
 15  DONALD E. WILKES, JR., STATE POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF HANDBOOK 
18 (2016). 
 16  Id. at 23.   
IMWINKELRIED (DO NOT DELETE) 8/8/2018  1:39 PM 
2018] DEBUNKED, DISCREDITED, BUT STILL DEFENDED 1099 
the wrongful conviction studies.17  Of the first 250 DNA exoneration cases 
in the United States, more than half of the cases involved overstated or 
invalid expert testimony.18  One study of 156 accused exonerated by post-
conviction DNA testing reported that at 60% of the trials, “forensic analysts 
called by the prosecution provided invalid testimony . . . —that is, testimony 
with conclusions misstating empirical data or wholly unsupported by 
empirical data.”19  In order to address these deficiencies, several states 
(including New York and Texas) have established forensic science 
commissions to oversee the government laboratories and agencies providing 
expert witness services.20  For their part, twenty-six localities have created 
conviction integrity review units.21 
B. The Probability That in the Future the Courts Will Be Asked to 
Grant Post-Conviction Relief Based on Subsequently Invalidated 
Expert Testimony in a Significant Number of Cases 
The past revelations have raised the consciousness of the general 
problem of wrongful convictions.  In the future the courts will probably face 
a large number of cases in which the basis for relief is the claim that 
subsequent scientific research has invalidated expert testimony that 
contributed to the prior conviction. 
In the typical case not involving expert testimony, several factors 
concur to minimize the probability that there will be a future, plausible attack 
on the prior conviction or another accused’s conviction.  Only a limited 
number of persons have a strong incentive to scrutinize the testimony 
underlying the prior conviction.  To be sure, the accused, his or her counsel, 
and his or her family may be motivated to do so.  However, it will be the rare 
third party whose sense of justice or curiosity is so strong that they are 
willing to devote time and resources to a post-conviction investigation.  
 
 17  Inger H. Chandler, Conviction Integrity Review Units: Owning the Past, Changing the 
Future, 31 CRIM. JUST. 14, 15 (2016).  See also BOAZ SANGERO, SAFETY FROM FALSE 
CONVICTIONS (2016); Erin Murphy, Neuroscience and the Civil /Criminal Daubert Divide, 85 
FORDHAM L. REV. 619, 634 (2016) (“The raised awareness of the problem of wrongful 
conviction, and the prominent role that faulty science has played in those injustices . . . .”).   
 18  Brandon L. Garrett, Bad Hair: The Legal Response to Mass Forensic Errors, 42 LITIG. 
32, 32, 33 (2016).   
 19  Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and 
Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009) (noting that there were 82 such cases: “this 
set of trials included invalid testimony by 72 forensic analysts called by the prosecution and 
employed by 52 laboratories, practices, or hospitals from 25 states”).   
 20  Ryan & Adams, supra note 14, at 1110; FORENSIC TECH. CTR. OF EXCELLENCE, NAT’L 
INST. OF JUST. & RTI INT’L, STATE FORENSIC SCIENCE COMMISSIONS: FINAL REPORT (Nov. 
2016), https://rti.connectsolutions.com/sfsc; Caitlin M. Plummer & Imran J. Syed, Criminal 
Procedure vs. Scientific Progress: The Challenging Path to Post-Conviction Relief in Cases 
That Arise During Periods of Shifts in Science, 41 VT. L. REV. 279, 333 (2016).   
 21  Chandler, supra note 17, at 15; Plummer & Syed, supra note 20, at 338.   
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Moreover, even when these investigators tender the court’s evidence to 
challenge the validity of the prior conviction, many courts are skeptical of 
the reliability of the new evidence.  Generally, investigators such as members 
of the accused’s family are hardly impartial; and the courts fear that they 
might have resorted to bribery or duress to obtain the new evidence.22  For 
that reason, the investigators’ tender of new evidence does not guarantee that 
the court will grant post-conviction relief.23  The tender is often greeted with 
judicial skepticism.  Finally, even if the investigators succeed in overturning 
the prior conviction, their efforts will likely affect only that case.  Their 
investigation is usually case-specific.  Thus, even if the investigators unearth 
persuasive evidence of false confession or mistaken eyewitness 
identification, that evidence ordinarily will have no impact on any other case. 
In each respect, expert testimony cases differ radically.  Although in the 
typical case only a small number of persons will pursue a later investigation 
into the evidence that served as the basis for the prior conviction, in an expert 
testimony case, thousands of scientists worldwide may be engaged in 
ongoing research into the validity of the expert technique in question.  The 
state of the research into the technique’s validity may very well be “in 
flux.”24  Furthermore, the vast majority of these scientific investigators will 
be strangers to the prior litigation and, hence, more impartial.  Even if a court 
is reluctant to grant a new trial based on testimony by a lay witness 
discovered by the accused’s family, the court may be receptive to testimony 
by a German physicist who made a discovery during her independent 
research.  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the significance of the 
scientific discovery is likely to transcend the post-trial proceeding in which 
testimony about the discovery is offered.25  Unlike the case-specific 
testimony offered in the typical case,26 the subsequent discovery may relate 
to a general scientific question27 that arose in hundreds or thousands of prior 
criminal trials.  Together, these factors create a good probability that in future 
post-conviction relief proceedings, many courts will have to grapple with the 
question of the impact of subsequent scientific research.  If a prior conviction 
rested on expert testimony, has the later research raised such grave questions 
about the reliability of the testimony that the accused should receive a new 
trial? 
 
 22  Janice J. Repka, Comment, Rethinking the Standard for New Trial Motions Based 
Upon Recantations as Newly Discovered Evidence, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1433, 1442 (1986).   
 23  Id.; Tim A. Thomas, Standard for Granting or Denying New Trial in State Criminal 
Case on Basis of Recanted Testimony: Modern Cases, 77 A.L.R.4th 1031 (1989).   
 24  Gimenez v. Ochoa, 821 F.3d 1136, 1146 (9th Cir. 2016).   
 25  David L. Faigman, Appellate Review of Scientific Evidence Under Daubert and Joiner, 
48 HASTINGS L.J. 969, 974, 976–79 (1997). 
 26  Id. at 976, 979. 
 27  Id. at 976–77. 
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This question has become so pressing that several jurisdictions have 
recently amended their post-conviction relief statutes to address the question.  
In 2014, the California legislature amended Penal Code Section 1473.  That 
statute governs the grant of new trial motions when a prior conviction rests 
on “false evidence.”28  As amended, Section 1473(e)(1) now reads: “For 
purposes of this section, ‘false evidence’ shall include opinions of experts 
that have been repudiated by the expert who originally provided the opinion 
at a hearing or trial or that has been undermined by later scientific research 
or technological advances.”29  The amendment took effect in 2015.  In the 
same year, Texas revised its Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.073.  
Subsection (a) of that statute now provides that an accused is entitled to a 
new trial if he or she presents testimony about expert research that “was not 
available . . . at the convicted person’s trial” and that “contradicts scientific 
evidence relied on by the state at trial.”30 
The purpose of this Article is to assess the advisability of post-
conviction relief legislation specifically addressing the issue of the 
subsequent invalidation of expert testimony that served as the basis for a 
prior conviction.  Part II of this Article defines and delimits the scope of this 
Article. It explains that this Article addresses the problem as an issue of 
criminal justice policy, not as a matter of constitutional law.  Part III turns to 
the question of when, if ever, subsequent scientific research should justify a 
new trial.  To what extent must the later research call into question the 
reliability of the earlier expert testimony?  And which components of the 
prior expert reasoning can be targeted?  Finally, Part IV takes up the question 
of the adequacy of the existing state post-conviction relief legislation.  
Assume that as a matter of policy an accused should obtain relief in the 
situations identified in Part III.  Are the existing statutes worded broadly 
enough that we can be confident that a deserving accused can obtain relief?  
If not, is the wording of the new California or Texas legislation an optimal 




 28  WILKES, JR., supra note 15, § 7:61 (“[T]he legislation was originally introduced to 
address a problem illustrated by the so-called Rampart scandal in which it was discovered that 
certain Los Angeles Police Department officers had engaged in misconduct, including 
planting evidence, filing false police reports, committing perjury, and creating nonexistent 
confessions.”).  See Fabricant & Carrington, supra note 13, at 33–35 (discussing the new 
California and Texas legislation).   
 29  CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473(e)(1) (West 2017). 
 30  TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.073 (West 2015).  
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II. DELIMITING AND DEFINING THE TOPIC 
This problem area raises a plethora of issues.  An article of this length 
can mention some of those issues in passing, but it cannot hope to adequately 
address all the aspects of the problem.  Therefore, before defining the topic 
of this Article, it is critical to delimit the topic and identify the issues that are 
beyond its scope.  In particular, this Article does not address three related 
topics: (A) constitutional claims; (B) claims based on scientific research 
available at the time of the prior trial; and (C) the role that the subsequently 
invalidated scientific evidence played at the prior trial. 
A. Constitutional Claims 
This Article does not discuss the question of whether there is a 
constitutional right to post-conviction relief in the situations identified in 
Part III.  In the past, the Supreme Court has indicated that 
 
[t]he Constitution . . . protects a defendant against a conviction 
based on evidence of questionable reliability, not by prohibiting 
the introduction of the evidence, but by affording the defendant 
means to persuade the jury that the evidence should be discounted 
as unworthy of credit.  Constitutional safeguards available to 
defendants to counter the State’s evidence include the Sixth 
Amendments right to counsel; compulsory process; and 
confrontation plus cross-examination of witnesses.31 
 
In Herrera v. Collins,32 the Court observed that it has never treated a claim 
of innocence based on newly discovered evidence as a basis for federal 
habeas corpus relief absent an independent constitutional violation.33 
However, in her concurrence in Herrera, Justice O’Connor was willing 
to assume arguendo that “a truly persuasive of actual innocence would 
render any . . . execution unconstitutional . . . .”34  Later in House v. Bell,35 
the Court referred to a “hypothetical freestanding innocence claim.”  The 
 
 31  Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 237 (2012).  See Iannece, supra note 12, at 
210–11; Plummer & Syed, supra note 20, at 305 (“the Due Process Clause has traditionally 
been understood to guarantee procedures, not outcomes”).   
 32  Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).  See Plummer & Syed, supra note 20, at 323–
24. 
 33  506 U.S. at 389–99.  See Justin Brooks, Alexander Simpson & Paige Kaneb, If 
Hindsight Is 20/20, Our Justice System Should Not Be Blind to New Evidence of Innocence: 
A Survey of Post-Conviction New Evidence Statutes and a Proposed Model, 79 ALB. L. REV. 
1045, 1051 (2016). 
 34  506 U.S. at 427 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  See Plummer & Syed, supra note 20, at 
324 (“[A]t least five members of the Court . . . would have explicitly held that a freestanding 
claim of actual innocence is cognizable, at least under certain circumstances.”).   
 35  House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 555 (2006). 
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freestanding theory enjoys some scholarly support.36  A number of state 
courts have held that “the conviction of an innocent person [is itself] . . . a 
violation of due process.”37  Moreover, several lower federal courts have 
acknowledged the theoretical possibility of a “freestanding” constitutional 
“innocence claim.”38  However, those courts have cautioned that even if such 
a claim is possible, the threshold would be “extraordinarily high”39 and that 
relief would be available “only in very narrow circumstances.”40 
This Article does not venture into that constitutional thicket.  It 
undertakes a non-constitutional policy analysis.  Rather than invoking due 
process, this Article poses this question: If our criminal justice system is now 
so dependent on expert testimony and the trajectory of science makes it 
inevitable that subsequent research will sometimes invalidate the expert 
testimony that a prior conviction rests on, should post-conviction relief 
statutes afford the wrongly accused a remedy? 
B. Claims Based on Scientific Research Available at the Time of the 
Prior Trial 
This Article has the same temporal focus as the new California and 
Texas legislation.  California Penal Code Section 1473(e)(1) expressly refers 
to expert testimony that has “been undermined by later scientific research or 
technological advances.”  Likewise, under Texas Code of Criminal 
Procedure Article 11.073(a)(1), the scientific research that the accused relies 
on must “not [have been] available . . . at the convicted person’s trial.”41  The 
research must constitute after-discovered evidence that could not have been 
offered at trial despite the exercise of due diligence by the defense counsel. 
If the scientific studies were available at the time of the prior trial, the 
accused’s primary avenue for relief is an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim.42  The Supreme Court upheld such a claim in its 2014 decision in 
 
 36  Iannece, supra note 12.   
 37  See e.g., Chandler, supra note 17, at 16 (Texas law).   
 38  Gimenez v. Ochoa, 821 F.3d 1136, 1144 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Albrecht v. Horn, 485 
F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 2007)).   
 39  Albrecht, 485 F.3d at 122.   
 40  Gimenez, 821 F.3d at 1145.   
 41  Ex parte Avila, No. WR–59,662–02, 2016 WL 922191 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 9, 
2016).  See Plummer & Syed, supra note 20, at 284–89 (noting that new scientific information 
is not distributed perfectly; it takes time for the research to “percolate;” even if it is circulating 
within the scientific community, as a practical matter, it may be unavailable to defense 
counsel; it is too much to expect counsel to discover new scientific research as soon as it is 
released); Caitlin M. Plummer & Imran J. Syed, “Shifted Science” Revisited:  Percolation 
Delays and the Persistence of Wrongful Convictions Based on Outdated Science, 64 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 483 (2016).  See Fabricant & Carrington, supra note 13, at 33–35. 
 42  Brandon L. Garrett, Constitutional Regulation of Forensic Evidence, 73 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 1147, 1164 (2016); Brooks et al., supra note 33, at 1050, 1066 (noting due diligence); 
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Hinton v. Alabama.43  Hinton’s conviction rested in large part on firearms 
identification testimony.  When he later sought federal habeas relief, Hinton 
did not point to any new breakthroughs in the field of firearms identification.  
Rather, the thrust of his argument was that his prior defense counsel had not 
presented a competent attack on the prosecution expert testimony: 
 
The defense lawyer did hire an expert, one with poor vision and 
poor qualifications.  He testified that the revolver was corroded 
and could not be compared to any bullet.  The expert admitted that 
he had only the use of one eye, making it difficult to see through 
a forensic microscope.  Later, during federal habeas proceeding, 
new lawyers argued that Hinton’s trial attorney was ineffective for 
failing to hire competent and qualified ballistics experts.  The new 
attorneys hired three new and highly qualified experts from 
leading laboratories, who all concluded that the bullets were not 
fired from Hinton’s gun[.]44 
 
Even before Hinton, numerous lower courts had granted post-conviction 
relief when the trial defense counsel neglected to marshal readily available 
scientific data that would have permitted an effective attack on prosecution 
expert testimony.  These lower court cases involve arson analysis, cell tower 
evidence, fingerprint examination, pathology testimony, and 
pharmacological evidence.45 
 
Plummer & Syed, supra note 20, at 295 (noting that there are “two possible” relevant 
ineffective assistance claims: “(a) ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to discover the 
present an alternative to the science presented by the State; and (b) ineffective assistance of 
counsel for failure to object to and/or prevent the prosecution’s experts from testifying at all 
by moving to exclude their testimony . . . .”).  See State v. Behn, 868 A.2d 329 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2005) (discussing the reasonable diligence requirement). 
 43  Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081 (2014).   
 44  Garrett, supra note 42, at 1164–65.   
 45  Id. at 1169–70 (collecting cases).  See also Paul C. Giannelli & Sarah Antonucci, 
Forensic Experts and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 48 CRIM. L. BULL. 1360 (2012).  As 
the official Comment to American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rule of Professional 
Conduct 1.1 notes, these fact situations can raise legal ethical issues as well as constitutional 
law questions.  See also MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) 
(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).  In the classic statistical testimony 
case, People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1968), the court suggested that it was unfair to 
expect defense attorneys, unschooled in mathematics, to detect the flaws in the prosecution’s 
statistical evidence.  However, it is arguably the responsibility of the opposing party to learn 
enough about the discipline to educate the jurors about the limitations of the testimony.  Under 
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1 and 1.3, counsel owes duties of 
competence and diligence to his or her client.  MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1, r. 1.3 
(AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). The Comment to Rule 1.1 contemplates that it may sometimes be 
appropriate for counsel to research topics on the Internet in order to provide competent 
counsel.  MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (citing Ellie 
Margolis, Surfin’ Safari: Why Competent Lawyers Should Research on the Web, 10 YALE J. 
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Simply stated, when the defense counsel could feasibly have accessed 
the scientific research at the time of the accused’s original trial, there is no 
need to resort to special legislation such as the new California and Texas 
statutes.  Instead, the accused can invoke the well-settled doctrine of 
ineffective assistance of counsel and cite favorable, recent precedents such 
as Hinton. 
C. The Related, But Distinct Issue of the Impact of the Subsequently 
Invalidated Expert Testimony at the Prior Trial 
When an accused seeks post-conviction relief based on the subsequent 
invalidation of the testimony that his or her conviction rests on, the accused 
must satisfy a both/and proposition: the accused must not only demonstrate 
that later scientific research undermined prosecution expert testimony 
introduced at the prior trial, but also must establish that the testimony played 
a major role in persuading the trier of fact to convict at the prior trial.  Thus, 
the defense must prove the effect of the subsequent scientific research on the 
prosecution expert testimony as well as the effect of the expert testimony on 
the trier of fact’s decision.  Even when subsequent scientific research utterly 
discredits the prosecution expert testimony introduced at the prior trial, the 
accused should not be entitled to a new trial if that testimony played a minor 
role at the trial. 
The standard for the latter showing deserves extended treatment in a 
separate article.46  The showing of the impact of the testimony on the prior 
verdict is just as essential to the accused’s claim for relief as the showing of 
the effect of the subsequent scientific research on the reliability of the expert 
testimony.  Moreover, the courts are currently divided over the standard for 
proving the requisite material impact.  One school of thought is that the 
 
L. & TECH. 82 (2007)).  Any contemporary counsel ought to realize that scientific testimony 
is frequently proffered at trial.  That is especially true in jurisdictions with discovery rules 
modeled after Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.  By virtue of Rule 16, if the defense 
makes a timely request, each testifying prosecution expert must provide a report outlining his 
or her testimony.  PAUL C. GIANNELLI, EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, ANDREA ROTH & JANE 
CAMPBELL MORIARTY, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 3.03 (5th ed. 2015).  Even if it was justifiable 
to excuse a defense attorney’s ignorance in 1968, a half century later, that excuse rings hollow.   
 46  That issue is the central focus of Brooks et al., supra note 33, at 1056–65.  The question 
is also one of the principal concerns of Plummer & Syed, supra note 20, at 299 (“material”).  
Neither article addresses the question of the method of determining whether the new scientific 
research raises sufficient doubts about the accuracy of the prior testimony.  Some of the 
published literature merges and thereby confuses the two, analytically distinct issues.  See, 
e.g., Caitlin Plummer & Imran Syed, “Shifted Science” and Post-Conviction Relief, 8 STAN. 
J. C.R. & C.L. 259, 268 (2012) (“The mere fact that a valid competing scientific theory has 
emerged suffices as ‘shifted science’ potentially calling the conviction into doubt. . . . [T]he 
legal standard for new evidence warranting a new trial, while it varies by jurisdiction, is 
generally targeted at whether the new evidence would have caused reasonable doubt if 
presented at trial.”).   
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systemic interest in finality is so weighty that the accused must demonstrate 
that it is likely or probable that the exclusion of the prosecution expert 
testimony at the prior trial or the presentation of new research challenging 
that testimony would have changed the outcome of the earlier trial.47  In 
contrast, other courts are satisfied with a showing of a reasonable possibility 
of an acquittal—in other words, a showing that the trier of fact might have 
reached a different conclusion.48  To muddy the waters, still other courts 
sometimes employ the standard of a reasonable probability that the newly 
discovered scientific evidence could have affected the outcome.49  That issue 
is a question for another day. Rather than discussing the standard for 
evaluating the impact of the new evidence on the verdict, this Article focuses 
on the effect of the new scientific research on the prosecution expert 
testimony.  Part III.A addresses the policy question of when the availability 
of such research trumps finality and justifies granting a new trial.  Part III.B 
argues that there are five situations in which a new trial is warranted.  Part 
III then turns to the question of whether the existing post-conviction relief 
statutes have to be amended to allow a new trial in those situations.  Are the 
statutes broad enough to allow relief? 
III. WHEN, IF EVER, SHOULD NEW SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH JUSTIFY 
AWARDING THE POST-CONVICTION RELIEF OF A NEW TRIAL? 
This Part addresses two issues.  The first, discussed in Part III.A, is the 
general standard for determining when subsequent scientific research has 
invalidated the prosecution expert testimony introduced at a prior trial to the 
extent that it ought to triumph over the public interest in finality.  Next, Part 
III.B identifies five situations in which later scientific research can satisfy 




 47  Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 121 (3d Cir. 2007) (“more likely than not”), cert. 
denied, 552 U.S. 1108 (2008); United States v. Mahdi, 172 F. Supp. 3d 57, 68 (D.D.C. 2016); 
United States v. Slough, 144 F. Supp. 3d 4, 14 (D.D.C. 2015); In re Miles, No. G046534, 
2017 WL 222569 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2017); In re Richards, 371 P.3d 195, 202 (Cal. 
2016); State v. Behn, 868 A.2d 329, (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005); Chandler, supra note 
17, at 15 (noting that the defendant “would not have been convicted . . . .”); Iannece, supra 
note 12, at 231; Plummer & Syed, supra note 20, at 316 (“a reasonable probability”); Repka, 
supra note 22, at 1439; Thomas, supra note 23, § 2 (noting that the leading authority is Berry 
v. State, 10 Ga. 511 (1851)). 
 48  Repka, supra note 22, at 1454; Thomas, supra note 23, at § 2 (noting that the leading 
authority is Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1928)).   
 49  In re Richards, 371 P.3d 195, 202 (Cal. 2016); In re Figueroa, 412 P.3d 356 (Cal. 
2018). 
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A. The General Invalidation Standard 
Suppose that at a criminal trial, the prosecution relies on expert 
testimony to gain a conviction.  After the trial, the scientific community 
produces new research relevant to the reliability of the expert testimony.  The 
new research could have several impacts on the prior testimony.  At one 
extreme, the research could confirm the validity of the prior testimony.  At 
the other extreme, the research could completely discredit the expert 
testimony.  To complicate matters, there are several points on the spectrum 
between the two polar extremes.  For example, the new research could 
simply call into question the validity of the expert testimony and create a 
controversy over its validity.  Or, even if the research does not affirmatively 
disprove the prior testimony, the research could raise such grave doubts 
about the reliability of the testimony that it would undermine any rational 
decision-maker’s confidence in the prior testimony.  As Holmes observed, 
the courts are always drawing lines.50  Where should the line be drawn here?  
At what point do the profound public interests in liberty and accurate judicial 
outcomes outweigh the considerable systemic interest in finality?51 
1. One Extreme, Subsequent Research Confirming the Validity 
of the Earlier Testimony 
At the two extremes, the answer is obvious.  If the later scientific studies 
generally confirm the validity of the prior testimony, there certainly is no 
justification for awarding a new trial.  Consider the relationship between two 
DNA typing techniques, the earlier Restriction Fragment Length 
Polymorphism (RFLP) technique using single-locus probes52 and the later 
Short Tandem Repeat (STR)53 technique.  Although the latter technique 
analyzes shorter fragments than the former technique, both techniques rely 
on length polymorphisms.  Depending on the number of loci STR fragments 
sampled, STR can yield more impressive random match probabilities (RMP) 
than RFLP.  However, the two technologies often yield results that are 
generally consistent.  In many instances, both technologies produce matches; 
and in a large number of cases, both yield exclusions.  In short, although STR 
proved to have more practical utility than RFLP, the advent of STR did not 
call into question the essential validity of single-locus probe RFLP.  If a 
litigant’s resources and time permitted, a litigant well might employ both 
RFLP and STR; and the result of one technique could corroborate the other 
 
 50  OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 127 (1881). 
 51  Ex parte White, 506 S.W.3d 39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (noting the choice between 
finality and accuracy in the results of cases).   
 52  PAUL C. GIANNELLI, EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, ANDREA ROTH & JANE CAMPBELL 
MORIARTY, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 18.03[b] (5th ed. 2012) [hereinafter GIANNELLI ET AL.]. 
 53  Id. § 18.03[c]. 
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test result.  In this situation, it would be a waste of time to grant a new trial 
solely because subsequent research made a new technology available.  A new 
technology can represent an improvement over a prior technology without 
condemning the prior technology as junk science. 
2. The Other Extreme, Subsequent Research Thoroughly 
Discrediting the Validity of the Earlier Testimony 
If we go back farther in the history of DNA typing, though, we 
encounter the other extreme in which the subsequent studies almost 
thoroughly invalidate the prior testimony.  When American forensic 
laboratories began utilizing DNA typing in the early 1980s, they employed 
a different version of RFLP based on multi-locus probes.54  When a 
laboratory uses multi-locus probes, the probe can strike several proximate 
locations on the same chromosome.  As the 1992 National Research Council 
DNA Report emphasized, the use of multi-locus probes made it improper for 
laboratories to employ the multiplication or product rule to compute the 
random match probability.55  After the laboratory had identified the genetic 
markers at the various locations, the laboratory would find the population 
frequency for each marker and multiply all the frequencies to compute the 
overall RMP—the probability that a random person in the same population 
would have the same genetic profile.  However, it is axiomatic that the 
multiplication or product rule may not be used unless the multiplicands (the 
probabilities or frequencies being multiplied) are independent.  If the sites 
are close together on the same chromosome, there is no assurance of 
independence.  For that reason, the 1992 Report recommended the 
immediate discontinuation of the use of multi-locus probe RFLP results as a 
basis for computing the RMP.  Laboratories shifted en masse to single-locus 
probes targeting sites on different chromosomes. 
In this situation, two factors concurred.  First, the two technologies 
yielded different outcomes.  An RMP based on multi-locus probe analysis 
often differed radically from the RMP based on single-locus probe analysis.  
Secondly, molecular biologists and population geneticists advanced a direct, 
foundational criticism of reliance of multi-locus probes; they identified a 
fatal flaw in an essential premise of the prior methodology, the lack of proof 
of independence.  The concurrence of those factors so completely discredited 
the earlier technology that multi-locus probe RFLP is now “passe.”56  This 
development reflected an immediate, widespread recognition that the 
subsequent scientific analysis had invalidated the prior methodology.  This 
is the rare case in which the later research exposed the prior methodology as 
 
 54  Id. § 18.03[a].   
 55  Id. § 18.04[c][2]. 
 56  Id. § 18.03[a].   
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“almost entirely unreliable.”57 
In that light, suppose that at an earlier trial, the prosecution had 
presented an impressive RMP based on multi-locus probe RFLP analysis.  A 
later single-locus probe RFLP analysis yields either an outright exclusion or 
a dramatically smaller RMP.  Given the foundational flaw in the use of RFLP 
multi-locus probe results to compute the RMP, it would be justifiable to grant 
the accused a new trial—assuming, of course, that the defense satisfied the 
other post-conviction relief requirements such as the requisite showing of the 
effect of the earlier RFLP testimony on the verdict.58 
3. Subsequent Research Raising Doubts About the Validity of 
the Prior Testimony 
Assume that after a criminal trial at which the prosecution relied on 
expert testimony, later scientific research raises a question about the validity 
of the testimony.  Standing alone, that should not lead to a new trial.  One of 
the most important passages in Daubert is Justice Blackmun’s frank 
recognition of the unavoidable uncertainty in investigational science:  “it 
would be unreasonable to conclude that the subject of scientific testimony 
must be ‘known’ to a certainty; arguably, there are no certainties in 
science.”59  In making that remark, Justice Blackmun drew on several amicus 
curiae briefs filed by individual scientists and scientific organizations.60  The 
traditional, popular view was that this is an orderly universe, governed by 
invariable physical laws that can be discovered by the classical scientific 
methodology of formulating a hypothesis, subjecting the hypothesis to 
empirical testing, and critically evaluating the test results.61  On that 




 57  Iannece, supra note 12, at 219 (quoting United States v. Berry, 624 F.3d 1031, 1041 
(9th Cir. 2010)).  See also id. at 220 (citing Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 517–18 (6th Cir. 
2000)) (stating “indisputably false”); Brooks et al., supra note 33, at 1048 (stating 
“completely undermine”); State v. Behn, 868 A.2d 329, 336–39, (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2005) (noting that subsequent research undermined the assumptions of Comparative Bullet 
Lead Analysis (CBLA) testimony; the opinion describes the research conducted by experts 
such as Erik Randich, a metallurgist at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, and 
William Tobin, a retired chief metallurgist at the FBI; and in a letter, Dr. Randich flatly stated 
that the available empirical data demonstrated that the assumptions underlying CBLA—
namely, that each production batch was unique and homogeneous—were “not valid”).   
 58  See supra Part II.   
 59  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).   
 60  Id. 
 61  Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evidence Law Visits Jurassic Park: The Far-Reaching 
Implications of the Daubert Court’s Recognition of the Uncertainty of the Scientific 
Enterprise, 81 IOWA L. REV. 55, 59–60 (1995). 
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However, as the amicus briefs informed the Court, that is no longer the 
modern understanding of the scientific enterprise.  Today there is a more 
realistic sense of the limitations of investigational science.  In some cases, 
scientists rely on deductive reasoning.  If one defines “two” in a certain way 
and “four” in a certain way, one can deduce that two plus two equals four.  
However, that is not how investigational science proceeds.  Modern 
scientists rely on inductive and abductive reasoning.  Suppose that when a 
scientist subjects a hypothesis to an empirical test, the result appears to 
validate the hypothesis.  That gives the scientist a measure of confidence in 
the hypothesis.  If a second test also seems to verify the hypothesis, the 
scientist can have even greater confidence in the hypothesis.  However, no 
matter how many test outcomes seemingly confirm the hypothesis, another 
test is always conceivable; and so long as that is the case, there is a possibility 
of subsequent falsification of the hypothesis.62  Thus, no matter how many 
test results apparently validate the hypothesis, in principle the hypothesis can 
be accepted only provisionally or tentatively.63  Absolute certainty is beyond 
reach. 
Suppose that after the trial, a single new scientific study reaches an 
outcome at odds with the validity of the expert technique relied on at trial.  
The subsequent research may render the prior testimony debatable but, at 
this point, the testimony has hardly been debunked.  The outcome in the new 
research could easily be an artifact.  The Ninth Circuit’s analysis of shaken 
baby syndrome (SBS) in Gimenez v. Ochoa64 is illustrative.  Some lower 
courts had earlier granted post-conviction relief to wrongfully convicted 
persons on the basis of SBS,65 but in this 2016 decision the Ninth Circuit 
refused to do so. 
The thesis of SBS is that the violent shaking of an infant can cause fatal 
brain injuries even if the infant’s brain does not strike any object or surface.66  
Many pediatricians and pathologists subscribe to the SBS hypothesis 
because there are documented cases in which the autopsy revealed such brain 
injuries when there was evidence of shaking but no striking.  These experts 
typically rely on three hallmarks to diagnose SBS: subdural hematoma, brain 
 
 62  Id. at 60–62.   
 63  Bert Black, Francisco J. Ayala & Carol Saffran-Brinks, Science and the Law in the 
Wake of Daubert: A New Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715 (1994); Brian 
Stuart Koukoutchos, Solomon Meets Galileo (And Isn’t Quite Sure What to Do With Him), 15 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2237, 2253 (1994).   
 64  See generally Gimenez v. Ochoa, 821 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 65  State v. Edmonds, 746 N.W.2d 590 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008); Iannece, supra note 12, at 
217. 
 66  See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, Shaken Baby Syndrome: A Genuine Battle of 
the Scientific (and Non-Scientific) Experts, 46 CRIM. L. BULL. 156 (2010).  
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swelling, and retinal hemorrhage.67  However, in recent years biomechanical 
experts have sharply criticized the hypothesis.68  They rely primarily on 
studies with primates and anthropomorphic models.  Those studies suggest 
that without more, mere shaking cannot generate enough force to cause fatal 
injury to the infant brain. 
At Gimenez’s original trial, the prosecution presented a pediatrician’s 
testimony about SBS.  After his conviction, Gimenez sought post-conviction 
relief.  He cited the subsequent studies questioning SBS: 
 
He points to a number of articles supporting his claim that medical 
knowledge surrounding SBS has changed in the years since his 
conviction.  In his view, no longer do forensic pathologists 
diagnose SBS simply by noting the presence of the telltale triad of 
injuries.  Now, the medical community requires evidence of 
impact injuries before diagnosing SBS.69 
 
Judge Kozinski wrote for the court.  He conceded that several studies lent 
support to Gimenez’ position.  However, in the judge’s mind, a 
comprehensive literature review “reveal[ed] not so much a repudiation of 
triad only SBS, but a vigorous debate over about its validity within the 
science community.  The debate continues to the present day.”70  Indeed, 
some of the most recent scholarly analyses of SBS vigorously defend the 




 67  Gimenez, 821 F.3d at 1139, 1143.   
 68  Imwinkelried, supra note 66, at 174–80. 
 69  Gimenez, 821 F.3d at 1143.  See Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (stating that there has been a shift in scientific opinions about SBS).   
 70  Gimenez, 821 F.3d at 1145.  See People v. Flores-Estrada, 2017 WL 1520895 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Apr. 26, 2017) (although there is currently a legitimate debate over the validity of 
SBS, an expert may still base an opinion on that theory); Plummer & Syed, supra note 20, at 
327 (“the science is still very much in debate in that field . . . .”).   
 71  Joelle Anne Moreno, Extralegal Supreme Court Policy-Making, 24 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 451, 513–14 (2015) (stating there is “overwhelming scientific support and near-
consensus in the relevant medical community of pediatric healthcare” that shaking a baby can 
be fatal); Joelle Moreno & Brian Holmgren, The Supreme Court Screws Up the Science: There 
is No Abusive Head Trauma/Shaken Baby Syndrome “Scientific” Controversy, 2013 UTAH 
L. REV. 1357 (2013) (noting that in Cavazos v. Smith, supra, the prosecution relied in part on 
testimony about SBS; on the one hand, the majority of the Court upheld the legal sufficiency 
of the evidence to support the conviction; on the other hand, in a dissent joined by Justices 
Breyer and Sotomayor, Justice Ginsburg asserted that “doubt has increased in the medical 
community whether infants can be fatally injured through shaking alone”; the dissenters cited 
several papers as support for their assertion; the authors presented a detailed critique of the 
papers cited by the dissent; the authors concluded that the dissenters were “uninformed” and 
“promote[d] a false controversy”).   
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This situation is distinguishable from the previous situation in which 
the accused relies on an exculpatory exclusion or RMP, based on single-
locus probe RFLP, to attack prior expert testimony resting on multi-locus 
probe RFLP analysis.  It is true that in both situations, the outcome of the 
subsequent scientific analysis is at odds with the prior testimony.  In the 
RFLP hypothetical, the single-locus probe result undercuts the RMP based 
on a multi-locus probe analysis, just as a biomechanical expert’s testimony 
could seemingly contradict a pediatrician’s opinion based on SBS. 
However, there are two differences between the hypotheticals.  First, in 
the RFLP hypothetical, at the post-conviction stage, the defense experts can 
mount a direct attack on the methodology employed at trial by the 
prosecution expert; the prosecution expert had no right to use the 
multiplication or product rule absent proof of the independence of the 
markers.  In the SBS hypothetical, the defense biomechanical experts make 
an essentially indirect attack on the prosecution expert’s methodology; the 
thrust of the defense’s argument is that since the prosecution expert’s 
methodology yields different outcomes than the biomechanical analysis, the 
differing outcomes imply that the prosecution expert’s methodology is 
flawed.72 
Second, although many studies demonstrate the validity of the 
methodology of single-locus probe RFLP analysis, there are doubts about 
the methodology used by the defense biomechanical experts.  To be sure, the 
defense experts have every right to question the studies used by the 
pediatricians and pathologists subscribing to SBS.  The prosecution experts 
can point to documented cases of fatal brain injury without evidence of 
striking, but it is fallacious to leap to the conclusion that there was no striking 
in those cases: 
 
 
 72  The fact that technique number two yields a conclusion contrary to the conclusion 
produced by technique number one indirectly calls into question the methodology supporting 
technique number one.  It is true that in Daubert, Justice Blackmun cautioned trial judges that 
in passing on admissibility, “[t]he focus . . . must be solely on principles and methodology, 
not on the conclusions they generate.”  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 
595 (1993).  However, in Joiner, the Court stated that “conclusions and methodology are not 
entirely distinct from one another.”  Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).  If 
the new technique has been validated and consistently produces conclusions at odds with the 
conclusions yielded by the prior technique, there is circumstantial—but not direct—evidence 
that the methodology underlying the prior technique is unreliable.  The Advisory Committee 
Note accompanying the 2000 amendment to Rule 702 approvingly quotes In re Paoli Railroad 
Yard PCB Litigation.  FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment 
(quoting In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 744 (3d Cir. 1994) (“Proponents do 
not have to demonstrate to the judge by a preponderance of the evidence that the assessments 
of their experts are correct, they only have to demonstrate . . . that their opinions are 
reliable . . . . The evidentiary requirement of reliability is lower than the merits standard of 
correctness.”)).   
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[T]he caregiver could easily be traumatized by the event; and as a 
consequence, he or she might experience amnesia or “defensive 
forgetting” of any impact.  A loving parent’s recollection of their 
child’s head accidentally striking an object or wall might be a 
painful memory that the parent would want to repress.  On the 
alternative assumption that the caregiver acted in bad faith, in 
order to minimize his or her culpability the caregiver might 
deliberately withhold the detail that they struck the child’s head 
against an object or surface.73 
 
But for their part, the prosecution experts can criticize the defense’s 
biomechanical studies.  Medical ethics preclude shaking or striking infants 
in controlled experiments.  The result is that we know little about the infant 
neck and brain.  Consequently, we cannot be confident that the defense 
studies utilizing primates or anthropomorphic models accurately 
approximate infant physiology.74 
In the RFLP hypothetical, the defense experts not only employ a 
validated, single-locus probe RFLP methodology, but can also advance a 
direct criticism of multi-locus probe methodology employed by the 
prosecution expert at the earlier trial.  In the instant case, there are common 
sense doubts about the defense expert’s own methodology.  Further, even if 
the results of the biomechanical studies are accepted at face value, the studies 
merely indirectly raise questions about the methodology employed by the 
prosecution experts.  This controversy amounts to a genuine battle of the 
experts.75  It was therefore defensible for the Ninth Circuit to conclude in 
Gimenez that the later biomechanical studies do not thoroughly discredit or 
invalidate the prosecution expert’s SBS testimony at the prior trial. 
4. Subsequent Research That Falls Short of Thoroughly 
Discrediting the Prior Expert Testimony But Seriously 
Undermines Confidence in the Testimony 
In the prior variation of the state of the record, although the new 
biomechanical studies point to a different conclusion than the SBS theory, 
there are doubts about the studies themselves.  There are questions about the 
reliability of extrapolating76 from studies using primates and models to 
inferences about human infants.  However, contrast the following variation.  
Suppose that as in the case of the SBS, the new scientific technique yields 
different outcomes than the technique employed in the prior expert 
 
 73  Imwinkelried, supra note 66, at 174.  
 74  Imwinkelried, supra note 66, at 175–80.   
 75  Imwinkelried, supra note 66, at 200. 
 76  Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146. 
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testimony, thereby at least indirectly raising doubts the prior expert’s 
methodology.  But now the new technique has been more convincingly 
validated than the biomechanical analysis. That is the case with hair analysis. 
Assume that at the prior trial, the prosecution presented testimony about 
microscopic hair analysis.77  In the past, hair analysts have frequently 
overstated the probative value of a finding that two hair samples—perhaps 
one from the crime scene and another from the defendant’s person—were 
microscopically indistinguishable.  In an analysis of 268 cases involving 
testimony about microscopic hair analysis, the F.B.I. found that 257 
transcripts—96% of the cases—included exaggerated testimony about the 
significance of a match.78  Twenty-six of the twenty-seven examiners made 
such statements.79  In its 2009 report on forensic science, the National 
Research Council harshly criticized microscopic hair analysts’ use of 
language that expressly or implicitly indicates that a particular person was 
the source of a hair sample.80  In its 2016 report, the President’s Council of 
Advisors on Science and Technology reviewed the black box studies of 
microscopic hair analysis and found them wanting.81 
Assume further that after trial, defense experts conducted a 
mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) test that excluded the accused.  In an F.B.I. 
study of eighty hair comparisons in which microscopic analysts reported 
matches or associations, mtDNA analysis demonstrated that nine samples 
(12.5%) came from different persons.82  In short, just as the biomechanical 
analysts sometimes reach different outcomes than pathologists relying on 
SBS, molecular biologists employing mtDNA can come to a different 
conclusion than a microscopic hair analyst.  Would defense testimony about 
the mtDNA test result justify a new trial?  Here the answer should be Yes. 
The courts have repeatedly ruled that mtDNA analyses are admissible under 
 
 77  Giannelli et al., supra note 52, § 24.02[l].  See also Fabricant & Carrington, supra note 
13, at 63–92. 
 78  Norman L. Reimer, The Microscopic Hair Comparison Analysis Review Project: A 
Milestone in the Quest for Forensic Science Reform, 39 CHAMPION 9 (May 2015).   
 79  Id.  See also Ryan & Adams, supra note 14, at 1084; Spencer S. Hsu, FBI Admits 
Flaws in Hair Analysis Over Decades, WASH. POST (Apr. 18, 2015), https://www.washingto
npost.com/local/crime/fbi-overstated-forensic-hair-matches-in-nearly-all-criminal-trials-for-
decades/2015/04/18/39c8d8c6-e515-11e4-b510-
962fcfabc310_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.e7b2cecff4c1.   
 80  NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A 
PATH FORWARD 5–25 (2009) [hereinafter A PATH FORWARD].   
 81  PCAST, supra note 13, at 118–23 (noting that in one study, the test conditions did not 
come close to approximating normal casework where “the examiner . . . knew that all hairs 
being examined came from different individuals;” and  in another study, half of the declared 
matches were false positives).   
 82  A PATH FORWARD, supra note 80, at 25–26 (citing Max M. Houck & Bruce Budowle, 
Correlation of Microscopic and Mitochondrial DNA Hair Comparisons, 47 J. FORENSIC SCI. 
964 (2002)).   
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Daubert.83  Given the extent of the empirical validation of mtDNA 
methodology,84 a court can have far more confidence in an mtDNA exclusion 
than in a biomechanical analysis concluding that shaking did not cause an 
infant’s death. 
One court has already granted post-conviction relief in a hair case.  In 
2016 in Commonwealth v. Perrott,85 a Hampden County, Massachusetts 
Superior Court granted the accused a new trial.  At the prior trial, an FBI 
expert testified about hair analysis. He conducted a microscopic analysis of 
the samples with respect to such characteristics as color, the medulla, the 
cuticle, the cortex, scales, and pigment arrangement.  He opined that the hair 
samples “matched” in all respects and were “microscopically 
indistinguishable.”  The expert conceded that microscopic hair analysis 
cannot yield an absolute personal identification.  However, he added that a 
match in so many respects was evidence of a “strong association.”  
Elaborating, he asserted that “it’s my experience in 10 years it’s extremely 
rare I will have known hair samples from two different people I can’t tell 
apart.”  In awarding a new trial, the judge approvingly cited the 2009 NRC 
report.  Even assuming that the F.B.I. mtDNA hair study and the 2009 NRC 
report do not completely discredit microscopic hair analysis, in such cases 
the accused should be accorded a new trial when there is a subsequent 
mtDNA exclusion.  Evidence of an exclusion seriously diminishes 
confidence in the accuracy of the prior expert hair testimony.86  In the 
microscopic technique, the pigment of the hair is determined by the 
subjective judgment of the microscopist.  In mtDNA, the color of the dye is 
determined by a laser scanner whose accuracy has been tested and measured.  
Although the biomechanical studies raise some doubt about the validity of 
the SBS hypothesis, here the mtDNA evidence has a more profound effect.  
In the words of a Mississippi court, the subsequent evidence undermines 
confidence in the correctness of the earlier testimony.87 
What general standard emerges from the above analysis?  It is 
submitted that an accused ought to be entitled to a new trial when: (1) the 
accused presents testimony about a new analytic technique developed in 
 
 83  Giannelli et al., supra note 52, §§ 18.02[b], 18.05[a][1].   
 84  Id. § 18.03[e].  The validation studies break the process down into its various stages—
extraction, amplification, and sequencing—and attempt to establish objective standards for 
each step.  Id.  
 85  Commonwealth v. Perrott, Nos. 85-5415, 5416, 5418, 5420, 5425, 2016 WL 380123 
(Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 26, 2016).  See Lizzy McLellan, Getting a Conviction Overturned 
Without DNA, NAT’L L.J. 38 (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/sites/n
ationallawjournal/2017/04/03/getting-a-conviction-overturned-without-
dna/?slreturn=20180124162524. 
 86   The Supreme Court used similar language in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313 
(1989).   
 87  Yarborough v. State, 514 So.2d 1215 (Miss. 1987).   
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subsequent scientific research; (2) that technique yields a different outcome 
than the expert technique used at the prior trial; and (3) the validation of the 
new technique is so extensive that it either discredits the prior expert 
testimony or seriously undermines confidence in its correctness.  At the most 
recent meeting of the American Bar Association, the Criminal Justice 
Section’s report to the House of Delegates proposed a resolution that 
defendants be entitled to post-conviction relief when forensic evidence 
presented at the earlier trial has been “undermined or discredited” by 
subsequent scientific research.  As we shall see in subpart B, subsequent 
empirical research discredited Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis (CBLA) 
by exposing a fatal weakness in an essential premise of the technique; the 
research demonstrated that contrary to the FBI experts’ claims, the elemental 
composition of a batch of bullet production (a single day’s production at a 
particular manufacturing plant) is not unique and uniform.  As we have 
already seen, the advent of mtDNA testing seriously undermined 
microscopic hair analysis; given the findings in the black box studies of the 
latter technique, the validation studies of mtDNA provide a solid empirical 
basis for preferring the mtDNA result whenever the mtDNA result is at odds 
with a microscopist’s claim that a person was the source of the hair tested.  
The Constitution may not mandate a new trial in these circumstances.  
However, the American criminal justice is intensely concerned about the 
reliability of the evidence it relies on to justify convictions, and the proposed 
general standard operationalizes that concern. 
B. Illustrative Fact Situations Satisfying the General Standard 
Part III.A proposed a general standard for granting new trials based on 
subsequent scientific developments.  This Part attempts to identify specific 
fact situations in which an accused ought to be entitled to relief under this 
standard. 
Before attempting to do so, though, it is important to appreciate the 
general structure of a prosecution expert’s direct testimony.  Commentators 
sometimes refer to the “use”—in the singular—of an expert at trial.  In truth, 
an expert can be used in a variety of ways.88  Although there are other 
 
 88  An expert can give purely factual testimony under Rule 602.  FED. R. EVID. 602.  
Suppose that while driving, an eminently qualified toxicologist witnessed a car run through a 
red light and crash into another vehicle.  The toxicologist may possess a Ph.D. that qualifies 
him or her as an expert under Rule 702, but that does not preclude him or her from giving 
factual testimony based on perception.  FED. R. EVID. 702.  Alternatively, assume that after 
witnessing the accident, the toxicologist walked toward a driver’s car.  When the driver exited, 
the toxicologist noticed that the driver’s eyes were bloodshot, his speech was slurred, and his 
breath had a strong alcohol odor.  Like any competent witness under Rule 701, the toxicologist 
could testify to a lay opinion that the driver was intoxicated.  FED. R. EVID. 701.  Finally, 
suppose that at the driver’s trial for drunk driving, the prosecution has already called a police 
officer to testify about the result of an intoxilyzer test administered to the driver at the accident 
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legitimate uses of an expert witness under the Federal Rules, in most cases 
when a litigant calls an expert, the litigant wants the expert to testify in the 
form of a syllogism.89  The proponent of a psychiatrist’s testimony might call 
the witness solely to testify in general terms about the set of symptoms that, 
according to the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual V,90 is diagnostic for a certain mental disorder.  However, 
the proponent usually desires more from the psychiatrist; the proponent 
typically wants the psychiatrist to apply the diagnostic criteria to a particular 
person’s case history and opine whether the person suffers from that mental 
disorder.  In the final analysis, the psychiatrist’s testimony is syllogistic in 
structure.  After testifying to the credentials that qualify the witness as an 
expert, the expert:  states the diagnostic criteria, the general technique or 
theory (the major premise); describes the patient’s case history (the minor 
premise); applies the major premise to the minor; and finally derives a 
conclusion whether the patient’s symptomatology meets the criteria. 
The provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence regulate each element 
of the witness’s testimony: 
 
 Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that in order to qualify 
as an expert, the witness must possess “knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education.” 
 Federal Rule 702(c) states that the expert’s major premise must 
consist of “reliable [general] principles and methods.” 
 The rules impose two restrictions on the witness’s minor 
premise.  Rule 702(b) decrees that the minor premise must 
include “sufficient facts or data.”  Rule 703 adds qualitative 
restrictions.  Under Rule 703, the facts included in the minor 
premise must: (a) be based on the witness’s firsthand 
knowledge, e.g., a physician’s personal observation of a 
wound; (b) rest on admissible testimony of every element of a 
hypothetical question; or (c) be premised on secondhand, out-
of-court reports if it is the specialty’s reasonable/customary 
 
scene.  If the toxicologist takes the stand, under Rule 702 the toxicologist could “give a 
dissertation or exposition of [the] scientific . . . principles” underlying the intoxilyzer.  FED. 
R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment.  The note explains that the 
committee included the wording, “in the form of an opinion or otherwise,” to permit such 
general testimony.  Id.  The note accompanying the 2000 amendment to Rule 702 refers to 
“the venerable practice of using expert testimony to educate the factfinder on general 
principles.”  FED. R. EVID. 702.   
 89  See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, The “Bases” of Expert Testimony: The 
Syllogistic Structure of Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1988).   
 90  AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS (5th ed. 2013).   
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practice to consider reports from such sources. 
 Rule 702(d) requires a showing that the expert “reliably applied 
the principles and methods [the major premise] to the facts of 
the case [the minor premise].” 
 Rule 704 relates to the phrasing of the witness’s ultimate 
conclusion or opinion. 
 
The Advisory Committee Note accompanying the 2000 amendment to 
Rule 702 states that “any step that renders the analysis unreliable . . . [can] 
render[] the expert’s testimony inadmissible.”91 “Any step” should be 
interpreted as including all five components of the expert’s testimony:  the 
witness’s status as an expert, the validity of the witness’s major premise, the 
trustworthiness of the information about the case-specific facts constituting 
the minor premise, the manner in which the witness applied the major 
premise to the minor, and the formation of the final opinion.  As we shall 
now see, a post-conviction scientific development affecting any of these five 
components could conceivably satisfy the proposed general standard for 
awarding a new trial. 
1. The Witness’s Status as an Expert 
In a disturbing number of cases, post-conviction investigation has 
revealed that witnesses called as experts have misstated—usually 
overstated—their credentials.92  If the witness had accurately described his 
or her credentials, he or she  might not have qualified as an expert at all; or 
his or her credentials could have paled in comparison to the actual credentials 
of an opposing expert.  In either case, the false testimony might have affected 
the outcome of the trial. 
However, far more often than not, it will not be subsequent scientific 
research that exposes the falsity of the witness’s prior testimony about their 
credentials.  Rather, it will be ordinary fact investigation such as contacting 
the educational institution that supposedly awarded the witness a Ph.D.  That 
type of investigation does not produce new scientific evidence.  Furthermore, 
the potential discoverability of that information at the time of the prior trial 
 
 91  FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment (quoting In re Paoli 
R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir 1994)).  See also Iannece, supra note 12, at 
232. 
 92  In the District of Columbia, there was a scandal over the lies by one government 
expert, Johnny St. Valentine Brown, about his credentials.  United States v. Williams, 233 
F.3d 592 (D.C. Cir. 2000); United States v. Spinner, 109 F.Supp.2d 18 (D.D.C. 2000), aff’d, 
22 Fed. App’x 6 (D.C. Cir. 2001); United States v. Jones, 84 F. Supp. 2d 124 (D.D.C. 1999); 
David E. Rovella, D.C. Cop’s Lies Taint Trials, NAT’L L.J. (2000).  See also United States v. 
Gale, 326 F.3d 228 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (a government narcotics expert misrepresented his 
academic credentials).   
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suggests that any post-conviction claim based on the discovery will lend 
itself more readily to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.93 
However, there can be exceptional cases in which later scientific 
research discredits this element of the witness’s testimony or seriously 
undermines confidence in the witness’s qualification as an expert.  Suppose 
that at an earlier homicide trial years before, the prosecution called a witness 
to testify about bloodstain pattern analysis (BPA).  Initially, the courts 
routinely accepted testimony on that subject from police officers who had 
been trained by showing them photographs or drawings of patterns that were 
supposedly caused by a certain type of blood shedding event.94  In the early 
cases, as a matter of course the courts permitted such testimony even if the 
witness lacked a scientific background.  Some courts were satisfied by 
testimony that the officer had attended a two-week training course on the 
subject.95  In the intervening years, though, physicists turned their attention 
to bloodstain pattern analysis.96  Thanks to their research, today we have a 
much more sophisticated understanding of the behavior of blood.  For 
example, we now know that unlike water, blood behaves like a non-
Newtonian fluid97 and that its viscosity has a direct effect on its behavior.98  
A strong case can be made that only a witness with an understanding of 
physics, in particular, the significance of blood viscosity, is competent to 
opine about bloodstain pattern analysis.  Assume that at the time of trial it 
was well settled that a police officer with minimal training could testify about 
bloodstain pattern analysis.  In a post-conviction proceeding the defense can 
argue that subsequent studies of bloodstain patterns by physicists seriously 
undermine confidence in a pattern analysis by anyone lacking a knowledge 
of even the rudiments of physics.99 
 
 93  See supra, notes 39–43 and accompanying text. 
 94  Giannelli et al., supra note 52, § 24.13(a).  
 95  Id.  In the state conviction involved in Smith v. Massey, the witness was permitted to 
testify although his training course lasted only one week.  Smith v. Massey, 235 F.3d 1259 
(10th Cir. 2000). 
 96  Id. § 24.12. 
 97  Id. § 24.12, at 878.  See also ANITA Y. WONDER, BLOODSTAIN PATTERN EVIDENCE: 
OBJECTIVE APPROACHES AND CASE APPLICATIONS ch. 3 (2007); Aaron D. Gopen & Edward J. 
Imwinkelried, Bloodstain Pattern Evidence Revisited, 45 CRIM. L. BULL. 485 (2009).   
 98  Id. (noting that rheology is the study of non-Newtonian fluids).   
 99  Of course, in these cases, it will often be possible to conceptualize the fact situation as 
one in which the expert used an invalid major premise.  For instance, in the above bloodstain 
pattern analysis hypothetical, the defense could argue that at the prior trial, the expert relied 
on the primitive methodology of comparing the crime scene bloodstain to a pattern in a binder 
that the officer received in his or her training course.  The defense could then argue that 
subsequent scientific research has demonstrated that the only way to reliably analysis such 
patterns is to apply the laws of physics.  Even if the fact situation is not reconceptualized, the 
defense will have a strong argument that the attack has the requisite impact on the prior 
verdict.  If the original court should have ruled the witness unqualified as an expert, none of 
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2. The Witness’s Major Premise:  The General Technique or 
Theory the Witness Is Relying On 
As previously stated, after the witness’s proponent establishes the 
witness’s status as an expert, the proponent next may attempt to elicit the 
witness’s description of the general technique or theory that the witness 
contemplates using to evaluate the significance of the case-specific facts.  
This is the component of the witness’s testimony at the prior trial that can be 
most directly discredited by subsequent scientific research.  The history of 
forensic science is littered with theories that once enjoyed judicial 
acceptance but have since been exposed as “junk science.” 
Two notorious examples will suffice.  First, at one time, forensic 
scientists used the paraffin test to determine whether a person had recently 
discharged a firearm.100  The paraffin method tested the sample for the 
presence of nitrate residues.101  However, later research revealed that nitrates 
are so common that the paraffin method was very susceptible to false positive 
results.102  That revelation led most crime laboratories to abandon the use of 
the paraffin test.103  Second, in many cases, the forensic scientist is not 
interested in whether a particular person fired a weapon.  Rather, the crucial 
question is whether a bullet was discharged from a particular handgun or 
rifle.104  In the typical case, the prosecution analyst microscopically analyzes 
the striations on the bullet and attempts to match them to the striations of 
other bullets fired from the same weapon.105  However, suppose that the 
crime scene bullet is so deformed that it is impossible to visualize striations.  
Until relatively recently, in such cases the FBI sometimes conducted 
Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis (CBLA).106  The analyst used inductively 
 
the witness’s purportedly expert testimony would have been admitted.  If the prosecution 
needed the expert testimony to sustain its initial burden of production at the prior trial, the 
judge should have directed a verdict or entered an acquittal judgment as a matter of law.  Even 
if the remaining evidence made out a submissible case for the jury, the complete exclusion of 
the expert testimony will often make a defense verdict much more probable. 
 100  Giannelli et al., supra note 52, § 14.13(a).   
 101  Giannelli et al., supra note 52, § 14.13(a).   
 102  Giannelli et al., supra note 52, § 14.13(a) (noting that there were false positive 
reactions with tobacco, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, leguminous plants, and urine). 
 103  Giannelli et al., supra note 52, § 14.13(a); Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel 
Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 
1224 (1980).   
 104  Edward J. Imwinkelried & William A. Tobin, Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis 
(CBLA) Evidence: Valid Inferences or Ipse Dixit?, 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 43 (2003). 
 105  The 2016 PCAST report flatly asserts that this methodology lacks foundational 
validity.  PCAST, supra note 13, at 112.  However, assume for purposes of argument that that 
technique is sufficiently reliable.  As we shall see, the reliability of Comparative Bullet Lead 
Analysis (CBLA) is a different question.  Even if striation analysis is sufficiently reliable, 
CBLA has been exposed as junk science.  See Imwinkelried & Tobin, supra note 104.   
 106  Imwinkelried & Tobin, supra note 104.   
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coupled plasma atomic (or optical) emission spectroscopy (ICP-AES or ICP-
OES) to analyze the elemental composition of the crime scene bullet and 
other bullets connected to the suspect such as ammunition found at the 
suspect’s residence.  The analyst evaluated the bullets for the presence of 
several elements, including antimony, bismuth, and cadmium.107  When the 
analysis indicated that the bullets contained the same elements in the similar 
minute quantities, many courts allowed FBI experts to testify that the bullets 
came from the same batch (a day’s production at a manufacturing plant), the 
same shipment delivered to a retailer where the accused purchased bullets, 
or even the same box of bullets found in the accused’s home.108  Even if the 
expert gave the most limited opinion (the same batch), the opinion rested on 
the premise that each day’s batch is not only unique but also uniform in 
composition.109  Later studies of the bullet manufacturing process 
demonstrated that this premise was unfounded.110  Given those studies, in 
2004 the National Research Council released a report concluding that CBLA 
lacked scientific validity.111  Together, the report and the studies so 
thoroughly undermined CBLA that the FBI discontinued the use of the 
technique.112  In the preceding BPA example, the defense arguably satisfies 
the “seriously undermine” prong of the proposed general standard.  This case 
is an even stronger case for relief, since it can be said that the subsequent 
research triggers the “discredited” prong. 
3. The Witness’s Minor Premise:  The Sources of the 
Witness’s Information About the Case-Specific Facts That 
the Witness Will Apply the General Technique or Theory to 
After eliciting the witness’s description and validation of the major 
premise, the witness’s proponent may ask the witness to identify the case-
specific facts that serve as the minor premise.  As previously stated, under 
Federal Rule 703, the expert can rely on three different sources for 
information about those facts:113 (i) the expert personally observed the fact; 
(ii) prior witnesses have provided admissible testimony about the facts, and 
the proponent includes those facts in a hypothetical question posed to the 
expert; or (iii) the expert relied on a secondhand, out-of-court report if 
experts in the same field “reasonably” rely on that type of report. 
 
 107  Imwinkelried & Tobin, supra note 104, at 48. 
 108  Imwinkelried & Tobin, supra note 104, at 44–45. 
 109  Imwinkelried & Tobin, supra note 104, at 50–54. 
 110  Imwinkelried & Tobin, supra note 104, at 50–54. 
 111  NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, FORENSIC ANALYSIS: WEIGHING BULLET LEAD EVIDENCE 
(2004). 
 112  Giannelli et al., supra note 52, at 795–96.   
 113  FED. R. EVID. 703.  
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In the typical post-conviction proceeding in which the accused attacks 
the truth of these facts, the basis for the attack is not subsequent scientific 
research.  As in the case of the usual post-conviction attack on the earlier 
witness’s expert status, the accused will rely on evidence unearthed during a 
normal fact investigation.  At trial, the psychiatric expert might have relied 
on prior lay testimony or a secondhand report that the accused was coherent 
immediately after the shooting.  A later factual investigation unearths 
substantial evidence that instead, the accused was incoherent and behaving 
in a highly irrational manner.  In this situation, in the post-conviction 
proceeding the court would apply the normal standards for false lay 
testimony. 
i. Federal Rule of Evidence 702(b) 
In other cases, subsequent scientific research may impact the minor 
premise; but it will frequently be possible to view the later development as 
impacting the major premise.  By way of example, consider psychiatric 
testimony.  For some disorders, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
prescribes inclusionary criteria, that is, case-specific symptoms.114  At the 
time of the earlier trial, the DSM may have required only two relevant 
symptoms.  At trial, there was evidence of two—but only two—symptoms 
that permitted the expert to opine that the patient suffered from the disorder.  
However, later research persuades the psychiatric community to revise the 
standard and require three symptoms.  The application of that standard to the 
minor premise at the prior trial would have resulted in the exclusion of the 
expert testimony.  Federal Rule of Evidence 702(b) states that the expert’s 
opinion must be “based on sufficient facts or data;” and in light of the revised 
standard, the minor premise is now insufficient. 
In these cases, though, the facts can just as readily be viewed as the 
subsequent invalidation of the witness’s major premise.  At the prior trial, 
the witness relied on the theory that the presence of two symptoms was 
sufficient to justify the diagnosis.  The subsequent research undercut that 
premise; the new research superseded the prior theory and supplanted it with 
a new major premise that the diagnosis requires three symptoms. 
ii. Federal Rule of Evidence 703 
However, in still other cases, later scientific research could impact only 
the minor premise but still conceivably warrant a new trial.  Some courts 
construe Rule 703’s language governing secondhand reports as requiring a 
 
 114  Jules B. Gerard, The Usefulness of the Medical Model to the Legal System, 39 
RUTGERS L. REV. 377, 415 (1987) (discussing the research that led to the development of 
Feighner Criteria now included as inclusionary or exclusionary criteria for some of the 
disorders listed in the DSM-5).   
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showing that it is a customary practice within the expert’s specialty to 
consider that type of information in forming opinions.115  Suppose that at the 
prior trial, an arson expert testified to the opinion that an accelerant had been 
poured at the fire scene.  In forming that opinion, the expert relied heavily 
on lay witnesses’ description of the color of the smoke emanating from the 
burning building.116  At trial, the expert accurately testified that arson experts 
routinely relied on such lay reports.  However, after trial, new research 
demonstrates that lay witnesses’ color opinions are an unreliable indicator of 
the presence of an accelerant.  Lacking any training in fire science, most 
laypersons do not make the nuanced color differentiations necessary to 
detect the shades of smoke caused by accelerants—as opposed to the colors 
caused by other fire fuel.117  The new research calls the reliability of an 
opinion based solely on largely such secondhand lay reports into serious 
doubt.  In retrospect, the subsequent research would have precluded the 
expert at the earlier trial from opining that an accelerant was present. 
4. The Application of the Major Premise to the Minor Premise 
Rule 702(d) announces that proof of proper test procedure is a separate, 
required element of the foundation for expert testimony.  That requirement 
is sensible, since numerous proficiency studies suggest that improper test 
procedure is the leading cause of flawed testimony.118  Even when the 
witness, a Nobel Laureate, is using an exquisitely validated technique, the 
opinion can be unsound if the witness used sloppy, hurried procedure in 
applying the technique to the case-specific data. 
Subsequent scientific developments may call into question the 
procedure used at the time of the earlier trial.  In re Richards,119 a 2016 
California Supreme Court decision, illustrates the importance of changed 
procedure.  Richards involved forensic odontology, bitemark analysis.  At 
the original trial, the prosecution odontologist testified on the basis of an 
autopsy photograph.  The expert stated that a lesion on the victim’s hand, 
shown in the photograph, was a bitemark.  Before and at trial, the expert 
 
 115  Michael H. Graham, Expert Witness Testimony: Fed. R. Evid. 702 to 705 Primer; 
Hypothetical Question Discretionary Use, 42 CRIM. L. BULL. 1460, 1467 (2016).   
 116  Giannelli et al., supra note 52, § 26.04(c).   
 117  The Law Revision Commission Comment to California Evidence Code § 801 points 
out that under prior case law, Behr v. County of Santa Cruz, 342 P.2d 987 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1959), it was error to permit a fire expert to rely on lay bystanders’ reports about the fire.  
CAL. EVID. CODE § 801 (West 1966).   
 118  Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Use of Proper Procedure in Conducting Scientific 
Testing: Healing the Achilles Heel of Forensic Science, 43 CRIM. L. BULL. 371, 371–73 (2007) 
(collecting proficiency studies finding that improper test procedure was a common cause of 
error).   
 119  In re Richards, 371 P.3d 195 (Cal. 2016).  See Fabricant & Carrington, supra note 13, 
at 38–63 (discussing bitemark analysis). 
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relied on his visual inspection of the photograph.  Later, other experts in the 
field developed new computer software to digitally eliminate angular 
distortion in such photographs.  The digital technology was not available at 
the time of the original trial.  In a post-conviction proceeding, using the 
digital technology, defense experts testified that the lesion either was not a 
bitemark or at the very least did not match the accused’s dentition.  Presented 
with the results of the new procedure for analyzing the photograph, the 
original prosecution expert testified “I don’t know for sure that . . . that 
photograph depicts a bitemark” and that if it was a bitemark, “[petitioner’s] 
teeth . . . are not consistent with the lesion . . . .”  Even in the mind of the 
original prosecution witness, the advent of the new procedure significantly 
undermined confidence in the initial opinion. 
This basis for subsequently invalidating prior expert testimony is likely 
to come into play more frequently in the future.  In 2014, the Organization 
of Scientific Area Committees (OSAC) was created under the aegis of the 
Department of Justice and the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology.120  There are six general OSAC Committees and 23 
Subcommittees in such diverse areas as anthropology, digital evidence, 
DNA, explosives, friction ridge, and questioned documents.121  One of the 
principal purposes of the subcommittees is to promulgate new standards and 
guidelines for conducting forensic tests.122  Even in the short term, we may 
see a substantial number of new procedures designed to apply techniques and 
theories in a more standardized, systematic fashion.  The promulgation of 
these standards may be accompanied by commentary, marshaling new 
research that sharply questions the reliability of the prior methods of 
applying the techniques and theories.  If so, as in Richards the defense may 
have a plausible claim that the issuance of the new procedure significantly 
undermines confidence in the procedure employed at the time of the earlier 
trial. 
5. The Witness’s Final Conclusion or Opinion 
One of the contemporary refrains in the critiques of forensic science is 
that forensic witnesses often overstate the degree of definiteness of their 
opinion.  In its 2009 report, the National Research Council took many 
fingerprint examiners to task on this ground.  As the report noted, in the past 
examiners have frequently 
 
 
 120  The Organization of Scientific Area Committees for Forensic Science, NAT’L INST. OF 
STANDARDS & TECH. (Apr. 11, 2016), https://www.nist.gov/forensics/organization-scientific-
area-committees (updated Apr. 11, 2018). 
 121  Id. 
 122  Id.   
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claim[ed] that they have matched the latent print to the one and 
only person in the entire world whose fingertip could have 
produced it.  Given the general lack of validity testing for 
fingerprinting, the relative dearth of difficult proficiency tests . . ., 
and the lack of validated standard for declaring a match, such 
claims of absolute, certain confidence in identification are 
unjustified.  Therefore, in order to pass scrutiny under Daubert, 
fingerprint identification experts should exhibit a greater degree 
of epistemological humility.  Claims of “absolute” and “positive” 
identification should be replaced by more modest claims . . . .123 
 
The 2016 PCAST report reiterated the criticism: 
 
Statements suggesting or implying greater certainty are not 
scientifically valid and should not be permitted.  In particular, 
courts should never permit scientifically indefensible claims such 
as: “zero,” “vanishingly small,” “essentially zero,” “negligible,” 
“minimal,” or “microscopic” error rates; “100 percent certainty” 
or proof “to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty;” 
identification “to the exclusion of all other sources;” or a chance 
of error so remote as to be a “practical” impossibility.124 
 
However, it is a mistake to leap to the conclusion that the presentation of 
exaggerated testimony at the prior trial necessarily warrants a new trial based 
on changed science.  In many instances, if the defense counsel had diligently 
investigated the issue, he or she would have discovered the overstatement.  
The counsel might have been able to successfully expose the overstatement 
by cross-examination and the presentation of contrary expert testimony.  In 
short, as Part II noted, the fact situation might be ripe for an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim. 
In other cases, though, the defense may have a meritorious claim for a 
new trial based on changed science.  At the time of the earlier trial, the 
scientific community may have not appreciated that the claims were 
exaggerated, or the legal community may not have had reasonable access to 
the science needed to expose the exaggeration.  Post-conviction scientific 
research may be responsible for the subsequent realization that the prior 
testimony was overstated. 
Consider the case of blood or breath alcohol concentrations in drunk-
driving prosecutions.  In the past, the courts routinely allowed a police officer 
who had administered a breath test or a toxicologist who had conducted a 
 
 123  A PATH FORWARD, supra note 80, at 5–12.   
 124  PCAST, supra note 13, at 19. 
IMWINKELRIED (DO NOT DELETE) 8/8/2018  1:39 PM 
1126 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1095 
laboratory test to provide the jury with a single point estimate of the 
accused’s concentration.125  Especially when presented with only a single 
figure by a witness with scientific credentials, lay jurors are likely to treat 
the estimate as an exact value.  However, in the last decade the legal 
community has begun to understand the importance of metrology, the 
science of measurement.  The basic tenet of metrology is that no 
measurement is certain.  No matter how carefully the analyst conducts the 
measurement and no matter how well calibrated the measuring instrument 
is, the analyst can never be certain that he or she has captured the true value 
of the measure.126  It is sound metrological practice to provide the decision-
maker with both the estimate and an arithmetic measure of the estimate’s 
uncertainty.  In its 2009 report, the National Research Council recommended 
that “[a]ll results of every forensic science method . . . indicate the 
uncertainty in the measurements that are made.”127  In particular, the jury can 
be given a confidence interval for the estimate—a range with upper and 
lower boundaries.128  The additional testimony about the interval gives the 
trier a sense of the imprecision of the estimate. 
A Washington state drunk driving case illustrates the dramatic impact 
that the provision of testimony about a confidence interval can have.129  In 
Washington, the per se limit for drunk driving is a blood-alcohol 
concentration (BAC) of 0.08%.  In that case, the BAC reading, 0.081%, 
exceeded the limit.  The reading was marginal, just barely exceeding the 
0.08% limit.  Nevertheless, based on the reading, on direct examination a 
toxicologist initially testified that the accused had violated the per se statute.  
However, during cross-examination the defense counsel presented the 
toxicologist with evidence that with a 99% level of confidence, the interval 
for the reading ranged from 0.00731 to 0.0877.  The defense counsel then 
submitted an exhibit to the court.  The middle of the exhibit had a vertical 
line representing the 0.08% threshold.  The exhibit then superimposed a 
normal, Bell Curve distribution showing the interval.  The distribution was 
anchored on the reading, 0.081; the midpoint of the distribution was 0.081—
to the right of the 0.08 limit.  However, 44% of the area under the curve fell 
 
 125  See generally TED VOSK & ASHLEY F. EMERY, FORENSIC METROLOGY: SCIENTIFIC 
MEASUREMENT AND INFERENCE FOR LAWYERS, JUDGES, AND CRIMINALISTS (2015); see also 
Ted Vosk & Edward J. Imwinkelried, Measurements in Forensic Science—Of Errors and 
Uncertainty, 53 CRIM. L. BULL. 532 (2017).   
 126  Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Importance of Forensic Metrology in Preventing 
Miscarriages of Justice: Intellectual Honesty About the Uncertainty of Measurement in 
Scientific Analysis, 7 J. MARSHALL L.J. 333, 340 (2014). 
 127  A PATH FORWARD, supra note 80, at 184.   
 128  Donald P. Land & Edward J. Imwinkelried, Confidence Intervals: How Much 
Confidence Should the Courts Have in Testimony About a Sample Statistic?, 44 CRIM. L. 
BULL. 257 (2008).   
 129  VOSK & EMERY, supra note 125, at 169–71. 
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to the left below the 0.08 limit.  The exhibit, visually depicting the coverage 
interval, was powerful evidence that there was a reasonable doubt as to 
whether the accused had driven in violation of the statute.  The legal 
community is just beginning to realize the pertinence of metrology in general 
and intervals in particular.  There are only a few opinions on point.130 
Now, suppose that the direct testimony about the 0.081% reading had 
been presented at a prior trial that resulted in a conviction.  The defense later 
discovered the pertinence of metrology.  At the defense’s request, a 
toxicologist later computed the interval for the estimate in the prior case.  
Almost half of the area of the curve fell below the 0.08% threshold.  
Concededly, the new evidence about the interval does not completely 
discredit the earlier testimony.  However, the evidence would seriously 
undermine a rational decision-maker’s confidence in the earlier testimony 
that the accused’s BAC exceeded 0.08%. 
In short, like changed science with respect to every other essential 
component of the prosecution expert’s testimony, new science relating to the 
definiteness of the opinion could satisfy the proposed general standard for 
granting a new trial.  As a practical matter, though, it may be more difficult 
to obtain a new trial on this ground.  In many cases in which the subsequent 
scientific research affects one of the other four components of the prior 
expert’s testimony, the new scientific evidence might have resulted in the 
exclusion of the prosecution expert testimony at the prior trial. The new 
science could have led to a different qualification standard, and the 
prosecution witness might have been barred from giving any expert 
testimony.  Alternatively, the changed science could have discredited the 
witness’s major premise to the degree that the judge might have altogether 
excluded the witness’s testimony. Here, though, the new scientific research 
would simply have prevented the prosecution expert from overstating the 
definiteness of his or her opinion.  The trier would still have heard the other 
components of the witness’s testimony.  As Part II noted, obtaining post-
conviction relief is a both/and proposition:  The defense must demonstrate 
both the impact of the new science on the prior expert testimony and the 
impact of the attack on that testimony on the verdict.  It will be harder to 
make the latter showing when the new scientific studies affect only the 





 130  See State v. King Cty. Dist. Court W. Div., 307 P.3d 765, 766–70 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2013). See also People v. Jabrocki, No. 08-5461-FD (Mich. Dist. Ct. May 6, 2011), 
http://www.ncids.com/forensic/metrology/Jabrocki.pdf (noting an uncertainty budget).   
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IV. CAN WE BE CONFIDENT THAT WHEN AN ACCUSED SHOULD BE 
ENTITLED TO RELIEF DUE TO CHANGED SCIENCE, RELIEF WILL 
BE AVAILABLE UNDER THE EXISTING POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF STATUTES? 
Part III.A proposed a general standard for deciding when, as a matter 
of policy, later scientific research so discredits prior expert testimony or 
seriously undermines confidence in the testimony that the interest in reliable 
verdicts overrides finality.  Part III.B then identified five situations in which 
changed science can have that effect.  Now the question is whether an 
accused with such a claim can obtain a remedy.  All 50 states have statutes 
regulating one or more forms of post-conviction relief.131  Furthermore, as 
Part II noted, a few states such as California and Texas have recently 
amended their statutes to provide relief when later scientific research 
invalidates expert testimony admitted at a prior trial.  Is adequate relief 
available under the existing general statutes?  If not, could the new California 
and Texas statutes serve as drafting models?  If not, how should the existing 
statutes be amended to provide relief to accused with the types of claims 
described in Part III.B? 
A. The Availability of a Remedy Under the Current Post-Conviction 
Relief Statutes 
The early state statutes had a very narrow scope.  They allowed post-
conviction relief if the convicting court lacked jurisdiction.132  The 
legislatures gradually broadened the scope of the legislation.133  The 
legislatures extended the reach of the statutes to cover constitutional 
violations on the theory that a constitutional violation rendered the 
conviction void.134  Eventually the scope of the statutes was expanded to 
recognize certain types of non-constitutional grounds.135  For instance, 
California Penal Code Section 1473 allows relief when the prior conviction 
rested on “false evidence.” 
If a jurisdiction recognizes “false evidence” as a basis for relief, can we 
be confident that accused with the sorts of claims identified in Part III.B will 
obtain a new trial?  Unfortunately, the answer is No. 
 
 
 131  Wilkes, supra note 15, § 1:7; Ryan & Adams, supra note 14, at 1105; Note, State Post-
Conviction Remedies, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 681, 681 (1961) [hereinafter Note].   
 132  Note, supra note 131, at 689–90, 692, 703.   
 133  Note, supra note 131, at 689.  
 134  Note, supra note 131, at 689–90, 697, 703. 
 135  Note, supra note 131, at 689, 698. 
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1. Untruthful Testimony 
Some courts have construed the expression, “false evidence,” as 
requiring a showing that the witness at the prior trial gave untruthful 
testimony—in other words, forensic fraud.136  A classic illustration is the 
infamous case of Fred Zain.137  Zain had worked as a serologist in several 
states, including West Virginia.  The official investigation into his 
misconduct reached the following findings: 
 
The acts of misconduct on the part of Zain included: (1) 
overstating the strength of results; (2) overstating the frequency of 
genetic matches on individual pieces of evidence; (3) misreporting 
the frequency of genetic matches on multiple pieces of evidence; 
(4) reporting that multiple items had been tested, when only a 
single item of evidence had been tested; (5) reporting inconclusive 
results as conclusive; (6) repeatedly altering laboratory records; 
(7) grouping results to create the erroneous impression that genetic 
markers had been obtained from all samples tested; (8) failing to 
report conflicting results; (9) failing to conduct or to report 
conducting additional testing to resolve conflicting results; (10) 
implying a match with a suspect when testing supported only a 
match with the victim; and (11) reporting scientifically impossible 
or improbable results.138 
 
The investigation revealed a “long history of falsifying evidence.”139  The 
investigating judge concluded that Zain’s “pattern and practice of 
misconduct completely undermined the validity and reliability of any 
forensic work he performed or reported.”140 
In Zain’s case, the misconduct was so extreme and of such duration that 
it was easy to find “false evidence” in the sense of untruthful testimony.  
However, in the run-of-the-mill case in which experts disagree, the court is 
likely to find “simply a difference in opinion—not [intentionally] false 
testimony.”141  Even if in retrospect it is clear that the prior testimony was 
overstated, the court is reluctant to infer that the earlier witness lied.142  
Absent evidence of subornation of perjury or the falsification of 
 
 136  Iannece, supra note 12, at 232.   
 137  Gardner v. Ballard, 172 F. Supp. 3d 925 (S.D. W. Va. 2016).   
 138  Id. at 928 n.3 (citing In re Investigation of W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology 
Div., 438 S.E.2d 501, 503 (1993)). 
 139  Id. at 927 (citing In re Investigation, 438 S.E.2d at 503).   
 140  Id. at 928 (citing In re Investigation, 438 S.E.2d at 504).   
 141  Gimenez v. Ochoa, 821 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2016).   
 142  Sistrunk v. Armenakis, 292 F.3d 669, 675 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2002).   
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documents,143 the defense showing will probably fall short of justifying post-
conviction relief under the deliberately false evidence standard. 
2. Objectively False Testimony 
Part III referred to the California Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in In 
re Richards.144  As Part III.B explained, there the court granted relief under 
amended Penal Code Section 1473.  The court found that new digital 
technology eliminated the angular distortion in an autopsy photograph and 
seriously undermined confidence in earlier trial testimony that a lesion on 
the decedent’s hand was a bitemark. 
While Richards eventually obtained relief in 2016, that opinion related 
to his second habeas petition.  The court denied his first petition.145  At the 
time of that petition, Section 1473 had not yet been amended.  The statute 
did not incorporate the amendment addressing the impact of new scientific 
evidence.  Rather, the unamended statute required the defense to show “false 
evidence.”  In the opinion ruling on the initial petition, the majority of the 
California Supreme Court read “false evidence” narrowly: 
 
The majority in Richards I held that if an expert witness’s opinion 
given at trial later changes without any significant advances in the 
expert’s field of expertise or in any technologies employed by the 
expert, “it would not be accurate to say that the witness’s opinion 
at trial was false.”  [T]he fact that an expert recants an opinion . . .  
does not necessarily establish that the opinion at trial was false.  
Instead, the expert’s change in opinion “has merely demonstrated 
the subjective component of expert opinion testimony.”  [T]he 
“false evidence” standard under section 1473 [is] satisfied “[i]f, 
and only if . . . an expert’s opinion stated at trial was objectively 
untrue.”146 
 
After the initial 2012 decision, the California legislature adopted Senate Bill 
Number 1058 to amend Section 1473.147  The Senate analysis read Richards 
I as interpreting “false evidence” in a manner that severely limited its 
application to expert testimony: 
 
The Richards . . . majority upheld petitioner’s conviction, holding 
that “expert testimony is different from other types of expert 
 
 143  Gimenez, 821 F.3d at 1143.   
 144  In re Richards, 371 P.3d 195 (Cal. 2016).  See supra text accompanying note 114; see 
also Fabricant & Carrington, supra note 13, at 33–35. 
 145  In re Richards, 289 P.3d 860 (Cal. 2012).   
 146  In re Richards, 371 P.3d at 202. 
 147  Id. at 207.  
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testimony in that it is merely the opinion of the expert, not 
evidence in and of itself, and so can never be [objectively] “true” 
or “false.”148 
 
The upshot is that if a court construed “false evidence” in a post-conviction 
relief statute as requiring a showing of either subjectively untruthful 
testimony or testimony that would be deemed false under Richards I, an 
accused with one of the claims identified in Part III.B would probably not 
obtain a remedy.  It is true that the language, “false evidence,” is expansive 
enough that a court could read it to render the claims listed in Part III.B 
cognizable.  However, these statutes have existed for decades,149 and during 
that period, subsequent scientific research has overtaken numerous expert 
techniques such as the paraffin test and the Comparative Bullet Lead 
Analysis (CBLA).  If it is still unsettled whether “false evidence” 
encompasses expert testimony invalidated by later scientific research, it is 
unrealistic to think that a more liberal reading of the statutory terminology 
will become uniform throughout the states in the near future.  As the 
Introduction noted, given the amount of ongoing forensic research 
worldwide, in the near future the courts will have to grapple with the impact 
of changed science in a large number of cases.  Rather than wasting judicial 
resources, it would be advisable to amend the post-conviction relief statutes 
to clarify that accused with the claims identified in Part III.B can obtain a 
remedy. 
B. The Appropriateness of the Amendments to the California and 
Texas Post-Conviction Relief Statutes 
If an amendment is advisable, the next question that arises is whether 
either the California or Texas amendments should be used as a drafting 
model.  That question should be answered in the negative.  The California 
amendment is excessively broad while the Texas amendment is too narrow. 
1. The Texas Model 
The 2015 amendment to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 
11.073(a)(2) grants an accused a new trial when subsequent scientific 
research “contradicts scientific evidence relied on” at the previous trial.  
What standard does the term “contradicts” embody?  The popular, dictionary 
 
 148  Id. at 311 (quoting Sen. Rules Comm., third reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1058 
(2013-2014 Reg. Sess.), as amended June 4, 2014, p. 3.)  See also Iannece, supra note 12, at 
220–21 (quoting Ex parte Robbins, 360 S.W.3d 446 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (“explain[ing] 
that the expert’s ‘trial testimony is not false just because her re-evaluation of the evidence has 
resulted in a different opinion . . . opinion’”)).   
 149  Note, supra note 131.   
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meaning of “contradict” a proposition is to deny its truth or assert a logical 
incongruity.150  For example, the proponent says A, and the opponent 
responds non-A.  The term has the same meaning in evidence law.  Evidence 
recognizes two related impeachment techniques: specific contradiction151 
and proof of a prior inconsistent statement.152  When the courts attempt to 
distinguish the latter from the former, they often emphasize that the latter 
does not require proof that the witness made a prior statement that is “directly 
contradictory”153 or “diametrically opposed”154 to the trial testimony. 
The problem is that the Texas model is too restrictive.  As Part III.A 
noted, an accused ought to be entitled to a new trial if the later scientific 
research either completely discredits the prior testimony or seriously 
undermines our confidence in the testimony.  “Contradict” would probably 
subsume situations in which the later research altogether discredits the 
earlier testimony.  However, later research rarely has that impact.  Far more 
often than not, the new research will significantly undermine confidence in 
the accuracy of the prior testimony.  Part III.A contended that an accused 
deserves a new trial when the later research has that more limited impact, but 
the Texas model would not guarantee the accused a remedy in that 
circumstance. 
2. The California Model 
Just as the Texas legislature amended its post-conviction relief statute 
in 2015, the amendment to California Penal Code Section 1473 took effect 
in that year.  The amendment to Section 1473(e)(1) reads: 
 
For purposes of this section, “false evidence” shall include 
opinions of experts that have either been repudiated by the expert 
who originally provided the opinion at a hearing or trial or that 
have been undermined by later scientific research or technological 
advances.155 
 
 150  MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 171 (1972); see also 
Fabricant & Carrington, supra note 13, at 33–35 (discussing the new California and Texas 
legislation). 
 151  EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED ET AL., COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 714 (6th ed. 
2016). 
 152  Id. § 711.   
 153  United States v. Richardson, 515 F.3d 74, 84 (1st Cir. 2008); Udebma v. Nicoli, 237 
F.3d 8, 18 (1st Cir. 2001); Laboy v. Demskie, 947 F. Supp. 733, 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(“directly and positively contradict”), aff’d, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 3193 (2d Cir. Feb. 26, 
1998). 
 154  United States v. Cisneroz-Gutierrez, 517 F.3d 751, 758 (5th Cir. 2008); United States 
v. Gajo, 290 F.3d 922, 931 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Cody, 114 F.3d 772, 776–77 (8th 
Cir. 1997); United States v. Matlock, 109 F.3d 1313, 1319 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 155  CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473(e)(1) (West 2017).   
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The language “have been undermined” could serve as a useful drafting 
model with slight modification.  It would be necessary to revise the language 
to clarify that the later research need not “completely” undermine the earlier 
testimony.  Without that clarification, the language would be problematic for 
the same reason as the Texas model.  Without that clarification, the language 
would be too narrow and deny relief to some accused with the types of 
meritorious claims identified in Part II.B. 
However, the amendment’s reference to “opinions of experts that have 
been repudiated by the expert who originally provided the opinion” is 
objectionable for the opposite reason; namely, it grants relief too liberally.  
If the reference is interpreted literally, an accused is automatically entitled to 
a new trial whenever the earlier expert witness “repudiates” his or her 
testimony—even if the witness does not explain the reason for the 
repudiation.  Standing alone, proof that the witness has subjectively changed 
his or her mind and opinion should not be deemed an adequate basis for post-
conviction relief.156 
The prevailing view is that standing alone, a lay witness’s recantation 
of prior testimony is not a ground for post-conviction relief.157  Admittedly, 
a minority of courts treats a lay witness’s repudiation of earlier testimony as 
a basis for relief whenever the witness’s testimony was the sole basis for the 
conviction.158  However, that is not the general view.  In the view of most 
courts, a recantation alone does not necessitate a new trial.159  Rather than 
accepting the recantation at face value, the court conducting the post-
conviction relief proceeding inquires into the credibility of the recantation.160  
The court may demand substantial corroboration for the recantation.161 
It is especially wrong-minded to treat an expert’s repudiation of prior 
testimony as an adequate basis for post-conviction relief.  No expert schooled 
in the empirical tradition would accept a scientist’s change of mind without 
inquiring why the scientist has adopted a new view.  In Daubert, Justice 
Blackmun stated that reliable “‘knowledge’ connotes more than subjective 
belief.”162  At the original trial, the judge should never have admitted the 
 
 156  United States v. Slough, 144 F. Supp. 3d 4, 7 (D.D.C. 2015) (“Some circuits have held 
that a witness’s recantation of trial testimony cannot be the sole basis for a new trial . . . .”).   
 157  See generally Thomas, supra note 23.   
 158  Id. § 9.   
 159  Id. § 10 (citing Antwine Equality Graves v. State, 187 So.3d 173 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) 
and then State v. Brown, 927 N.E.2d 1133 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010)).  See also id. at § 14(c) 
(citing several New York decisions); Williams v. Brown, 208 F. Supp. 3d 713, 733 (E.D. Va. 
2016).   
 160  See Thomas, supra note 23, § 5.   
 161  Id. § 10; see also Repka, supra note 22, at 1445. 
 162  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).   
IMWINKELRIED (DO NOT DELETE) 8/8/2018  1:39 PM 
1134 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1095 
expert’s opinion if it amounted to nothing more than the expert’s subjective 
opinion.  By the same token, at the later post-conviction relief proceeding, 
the judge should not accept the expert’s repudiation of the earlier opinion if 
the repudiation amounts to nothing more than a subjective change of mind.  
Yet, when the accused can advance one of the types of claims identified in 
Part III.B, there is a satisfactory reason for the repudiation.  For example, the 
expert could explain that subsequent research has discredited his major 
premise or significantly undermined confidence in the procedure that she 
used for applying the major premise to the case-specific facts.  However, if 
the expert cannot articulate such an explanation for the “repudiation,” 
standing alone, a repudiation does not justify a new trial.163 
The bottom line is that while the Texas model is unacceptable because 
it is too narrow, the California model is unsatisfactory because it is too 
liberal. 
C.  Amending the Post-Conviction Relief Statutes to Allow Relief 
When the Accused Has One or More of the Meritorious Claims 
Identified in Part III.B 
As Part I explained, this Article has a limited scope.  It does not deal 
with constitutional bases for relief.  Nor does it address the question of the 
required standard for establishing the effect of the invalidation of the expert 
testimony on the prior verdict.  The narrow focus of this article is the effect 
of the subsequent scientific research on the validity of the earlier expert 
testimony.  It would therefore be presumptuous to propose comprehensive 
language for a post-conviction relief statute. 
However, what about the portion of the statute describing the required 
showing that the later research has invalidated the prior testimony?  What 
lessons can be learned from the discussion in Parts III.A and III.B? 
One lesson is that any amended legislation ought to enunciate a broader 
general standard than the “contradiction” language in the Texas model.  Part 
III.A concluded that relief should be available in alternative situations: (1) 
when the subsequent research has the drastic effect of discrediting the expert 
testimony; and (2) when the research has the more limited effect of seriously 
undermining confidence in the correctness of the expert testimony.  The 
second prong is a variation of the wording of California Penal Code Section 
1473(e)(1).  That alternative prong is essential.  Formally, as petitioner, the 
accused has the ultimate burden of proof in the post-conviction relief 
proceeding.  However, given the profound constitutional values implicated 
by the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard governing at the original 
 
 163  See Iannece, supra note 12, at 220–21 (discussing Ex parte Robbins, 360 S.W.3d 446 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2011)).   
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trial,164 the accused should not be required to “completely dispel the old 
evidence.”165 
Secondly, unlike the California model, the amendment should not 
provide that without more, the prior expert witness’s repudiation or 
recantation of their opinion is an adequate basis for relief.  In the post-
conviction relief proceeding, the critical question is why the expert has 
recanted or why another scientist disputes that expert’s testimony.  The types 
of subsequent scientific developments identified in Part III.B can supply 
adequate answers to the why question.  Rather than asking whether the prior 
expert has changed his or her subjective state of mind, the judge ought to 
inquire whether the accused has established one of the five types of claims 
discussed in Part III.B.  There is no need to even refer to recantation or 
repudiation in the text of the amendment.  It does not matter whether the 
testimony of the prior witness or that of another expert proves the subsequent 
development; the dispositive issue is whether such a development has 
occurred. 
The final drafting question is whether the text of the amendment should 
specify the five types of claims listed in Part III.B.  If the statutory language 
did so, there would be the risk that judges applying the statute would treat 
the listings as pigeonholes and strain to cram the fact situation into one of 
 
 164  The fundamental liberty interest led the Supreme Court to elevate the ultimate burden 
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to constitutional status in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 
(1970).  At the end of the same decade, the Court would invoke the same interest as the basis 
for revising the constitutional standard for determining whether the prosecution has sustained 
its initial burden of production—the legal sufficiency test for determining whether the 
prosecution has made out a case submissible to the jury.  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 
(1979).  Prior to Jackson, the majority view was that the standard for the legal sufficiency of 
the evidence in a criminal case was the same as the standard in a civil case, namely, whether 
cumulatively the prosecution evidence was sufficient to support a permissive inference of the 
existence of every element of the charged crime.  However, the Jackson Court announced that 
due process mandates a more exacting standard, namely, whether the evidence would 
necessarily leave a juror with a reasonable doubt about the existence of the element.  Edward 
J. Imwinkelried, Jackson v. Virginia: Reopening the Pandora’s Box of the Legal Sufficiency 
of Drug Identification Evidence, 73 KY. L.J. 1 (1985).  The courts have yet to carefully 
examine the question of whether, under the Jackson standard, a juror presented with testimony 
by both the proponents and opponents of Shaken Baby Syndrome (SBS) would necessarily 
have a reasonable doubt about the defendant’s guilt.  In the typical case in which the courts 
apply Jackson, the focus is on the analysis of the absolute weakness of the prosecution case.  
As Part III.A explained, there is a plausible case for SBS.  See supra Part III.A.  Here the 
defense would make a slightly different argument; the defense would contend that in applying 
the Jackson test, the court should also consider the contrary defense expert testimony.  The 
thrust of the argument would be that the strength of the defense testimony so weakens the 
prosecution testimony that a juror who had heard both sides’ testimony would necessarily 
entertain a lingering, reasonable doubt about guilt.  Hopefully, in the near future, the courts 
will have occasion to address the merits of that argument. 
 165  Iannece, supra note 12, at 217 (quoting State v. Edmonds, 746 N.W.2d 590, 599 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 2008)).   
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pigeonholes.  In text, it is probably preferable to refer generically to “any 
essential element” of the prior testimony.  The drafters could follow the 
example of the Advisory Committee Note accompanying the 2000 
amendment to Rule 702, which, as previously stated, asserts that “any step 
that renders the analysis unreliable . . . renders the expert’s testimony 
inadmissible.”166  In similar fashion, the drafters could indicate in the 
legislative history that subsequent research discrediting or seriously 
undermining confidence in any essential element or step is cognizable.  
Then, just as the 2000 Note lists five additional factors relevant to the 
evaluation of the reliability of proffered testimony, the drafters could list the 
five types of claims identified in Part III.B. 
Negatively, an amendment drafted along these lines would avoid the 
mistakes committed by the California and Texas drafters.  Affirmatively, it 
would provide reasonable guidance to the courts tasked to apply the 
amendment.  Most importantly, it would largely assure that an accused with 
a meritorious variation of a claim identified in Part III.B will be granted the 
new trial that he or she deserves. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The wave of DNA exonerations is gradually coming to an end.167  Now 
that most law enforcement authorities have ready access to DNA testing, 
DNA testing is conducted before trial; and, understandably, there are fewer 
DNA exonerations after a conviction.168  In part, the criminal justice system 
embraced the process of DNA exoneration so enthusiastically because a 
post-conviction DNA test did not merely raise doubts about the accuracy of 
the prior conviction; an exclusion could “point unerringly to innocence.”169  
For that matter, in roughly half of the DNA exonerations, the post-conviction 
test not only exculpated the accused but also led to the identification of the 
real culprit.170  Those cases played out like a Perry Mason episode.  Before 
 
 166  FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment (quoting In re Paoli 
R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994)).   
 167  Kevin Davis, Prisoner Exonerations Are at an All-Time High, and It’s Not Because of 
DNA Testing, 100 A.B.A. J. 55, 57 (Sept. 2014), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/articl
e/prisoner_exonerations_are_at_an_all-time_high (“[E]xonerations due to DNA evidence 
have been on the decline for much of the past decade.  According to the registry, the number 
of exonerations in which DNA played any role dropped from 23 in 2005 to 20 in 2012 and 18 
in 2013.”); The National Registry of Exonerations, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exone
ration (last visited Apr. 20, 2018).  
 168  Davis, supra note 167, at 57 (“One of the reasons for the decline is that many of the 
cases in which DNA testing was available to clear the wrongfully convicted have played out.  
DNA testing is now routine, and it often clears suspects long before trial.”).   
 169  In re Richards, 371 P.3d 195 (2016) (quoting In re Clark, 855 P.2d 729, 739 (Cal. 
1993)).   
 170  BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 
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the end of every episode, Perry had both established his client’s innocence 
and identified the perpetrator. 
However, real life is not as simple as a Perry Mason episode.  In many 
cases, the new scientific evidence creates grave doubts about the accuracy of 
the prior conviction but falls short of demonstrating the accused’s undeniable 
innocence.171  When the new science undermines confidence in the earlier 
conviction without eliminating the possibility of guilt, the courts and 
legislatures have a far more difficult policy choice: they must weigh the 
competing interests in accuracy and finality.172 
Part III.A proposed a general standard for striking the balance between 
those interests.  Using that standard, Part III.B identified five situations in 
which it contends an accused is entitled to the relief of a new trial.  In all 
these situations, the subsequent scientific research does more than raise a 
doubt about the prior conviction; rather, the new science fundamentally 
shakes our confidence in the conviction.  The new research may not entirely 
eliminate the possibility of the accused’s guilt, but sometimes the doubts 
about the justice of the prior conviction are so pronounced that they trump 
the substantial public interest in finality of judgment.173  In these five 
situations, the sounder choice is accuracy over finality.174  The Idaho 
Supreme Court framed the stark choice aptly: 
 
The worst consequence of granting the [new trial] motion is that 
the state will have the expense of another trial . . . . [T]he worst 
consequence of denying the motion is that the defendants remain 
convicted of a crime which they might have not have 
committed.175 
 
In that case, the trial judge sagely commented:  At least in some instances, 
“justice is more important than expense.”176 
 
 
GO WRONG 5 (2011) (“In 45% of the 250 postconviction DNA exonerations (112 cases), the 
test results identified the culprit.”); Karen Kafadar & Anne-Marie Mazza, Using Faulty 
Forensic Science, Courts Fail the Innocent, LIVESCIENCE (Feb. 24, 2015), 
https://www.livescience.com/49929-faulty-forensic-science-failing-united-states-court-
system.html (“[I]n roughly half of the overturned cases, the new [DNA] evidence led to the 
conviction of the person who actually committed the crime.”). 
 171  Chandler, supra note 17, at 16.   
 172  Iannece, supra note 12, at 227; Brooks et al., supra note 33, at 1049. 
 173  Note, supra note 131, at 703. 
 174  Ex parte White, 506 S.W.3d 39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).   
 175  State v. Keely, 620 P.2d 284, 285 n.4 (Idaho 1980).  See Repka, supra note 22, at 1458.   
 176  Keely, 620 P.2d at 285.  See Repka, supra note 22, at 1458–59.   
